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TAKING DISCRIMINATION SERIOUSLY:
ONCALE AND THE FATE OF EXCEPTIONALISM IN
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
Steven L. Willborn*
In both the case law and the literature, sexual harassment is treated as an
exceptional and unique form of discrimination. In this Article, Professor Willborn
expands on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc. to argue that this exceptionalism should be rejected and that
harassment law should return to its roots in the broader body of antidiscrimination
law. Professor Willborn begins by articulating the contours of a discrimination-
centered model of sexual harassment and explaining how it differs from currently
accepted views. He then reviews the Supreme Court's recent cases on sexual
harassment, concluding that they support a discrimination-centered model of
harassment, but are inconsistent in important ways with standard current views.
Finally, Professor Willborn examines academic theories about sexual harassment
law through the lens of the discrimination-centered model, and concludes that the
model both applies more widely and is more broadly protective than the visions of
harassment forwarded in the academic literature.
The story of the development of sexual harassment law generally begins with
Catharine MacKinnon's Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex
Discrimination,' an extended discussion of why harassment is discrimination. One
of the ironies in the development of the law since the publication of MacKinnon's
book is the submergence of the discrimination element. Prior to the Supreme Court's
recent decisions, some courts and commentators defined sexual harassment as
unwelcome sexual conduct that either results in an adverse employment-decision or
is severe or pervasive.2 Under this view, discrimination is nowhere to be seen.'
Other courts and commentators have added a requirement that the harassment be
* Cline Williams Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. For helpful
comments, I thank Ramona Paetzold, Susan Poser, Stewart Schwab, Bob Works, and
participants at a University of Nebraska faculty colloquium.
' CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF
SEX DISCRIMiNATION (1979).
2 See infra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
At the least, discrimination is not an explicit element of the cause of action. Some
might argue that discrimination still must be proven, but that proof of "sexual conduct"
serves as an acceptable proxy for direct proof. As discussed later, however, this is a weak
argument. See infra text accompanying notes 20-26.
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"based on sex," but the element generally has been a mere formality. The oft-noted
"heterosexual presumption" means that the element is met without evidence in most
cases.
4
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc.5 is important because it brings discrimination back into sexual harassment law.
The holding in Oncale was that same-sex harassment is cognizable under Title VII,
but the rationale and emphasis in the decision was on the need to show discrimination
to make out a sexual harassment case. Same-sex harassment, the Court said, presents
just as viable a claim under Title VII as other types of harassment so long as
discrimination can be shown. In one sense, this Article is about what that
requirement means. How would taking discrimination seriously affect sexual
harassment law? How would it affect academic theorizing about sexual harassment
law? How would it affect the ability of sexual harassment law to withstand scrutiny
under the First Amendment?
This Article also uses Oncale to ask a more basic question: should sexual
harassment be treated, as it was prior to Oncale, as an exceptional type of
discrimination which requires its own set of principles, justifications, and legal
standards, or should it be treated as one instance of a type of discrimination that is
well-recognized elsewhere in discrimination law? In a broader sense, this Article is
an extended argument against exceptionalism and for bringing harassment law back
into the familiar territory occupied by the rest of discrimination law.
In Part I of this Article, I review Oncale and its important suggestion that
discrimination should be taken more seriously in sexual harassment cases. In Part II,
I follow up on that suggestion by considering what a discrimination-centered
approach to sexual harassment would look like and by comparing it with the current
approach, which minimizes the role of discrimination. In Part III, I analyze the
Supreme Court's sexual harassment cases to determine the extent to which they
support or undermine the discrimination-centered and current approaches. I conclude
that the cases generally support the discrimination-centered approach, but are
inconsistent with the current approach in important ways. In Part IV, I consider
current academic theorizing about sexual harassment. The discrimination-centered
approach is used both as a lens through which to view and critique these theories and
as an object which can be brought into better focus by observation through the lens
of the theories. Also in Part IV, I consider First Amendment criticisms of sexual
harassment law, concluding that a discrimination-centered approach to sexual
harassment greatly weakens this type of attack on harassment law. Finally, in Part
V, I conclude with some broader arguments in support of a discrimination-centered
approach to sexual harassment.
* See infra text accompanying notes 27-32.S118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
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I. ONCALE AND TEA LEAVES
Oncale, like many sexual harassment cases, presents an appalling set of facts.6
Joseph Oncale was a member of an eight-man crew working on an oil platform in the
Gulf of Mexico. While on the platform, he was subjected to several humiliating, sex-
related actions, physically assaulted in a sexual manner, and threatened with rape, all
by his male coworkers. He complained to supervisors, but they did nothing. Then
he quit, and sued.7
The district and appellate courts dismissed Oncale's claim because "same-sex
harassment claims are not viable under Title VII."' The Supreme Court reversed,
finding unanimously that "same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title
VII. ' 9 At its most basic level, then, Oncale simply is about same-sex harassment: the
Court held that same-sex harassment claims are cognizable under Title VII. The only
necessary consequence of the Oncale holding, narrowly construed, is that people may
bring harassment claims when they are harassed by people of the same sex.
The Court's rationale, however, hints of broader implications. The primary
emphasis in the majority opinion was on the need to show "discrimination because
of sex" to establish a sexual harassment case. In the unanimous opinion, Justice
Scalia began by citing the statutory requirement of "discrimination ... because
of... sex" 0 and then repeatedly referred to the requirement throughout the opinion."
At one point, he said flatly that "Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical
harassment in the workplace; it is directed only at 'discriminat[ion] ... because
of... sex."" 2 Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion in which he made clear that
he agreed with the majority only because the Court "stresse[d]" that sexual
harassment cases require discrimination "because of... sex."' 3 The Court reversed
the Fifth Circuit because its holding that same-sex harassment claims are never
cognizable under Title VII was erroneous: discrimination is a possibility in same-sex
6 The case was presented to the Court after the lower courts granted and affirmed
summary judgment for the employer. Consequently, the Supreme Court accepted as true the
facts as alleged by the plaintiff. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1000. The case later was settled on
the eve of trial. See Heather Bodell, Sexual Harassment: Parties Settle Same-Sex
Harassment Suit Just Short of Trial Before Federal Jury, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 209,
at A-4 (Oct. 29, 1998).
7 See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1000-01.
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 120 (5th Cir. 1996).
9Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003.
,o Id at 1001 (citing Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1) (1994)).
" The discussion portion of the majority opinion was less than three pages long. In that
space, Justice Scalia referred to the "discrimination because of sex" requirement seven times.
See id at 1001-03.
"2 Id. at 1002 (emphasis omitted).
13 Id. at 1003 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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harassment cases just as it is in same-sex discrimination cases that do not involve
harassment. 4 But to say that discrimination is a possibility is not to say that it always
is present. The thrust of the Court's rationale in Oncale was that an explicit finding
of discrimination is required, in harassment cases as in others."
The Court was much less clear, however, on what it would mean for sexual
harassment doctrine to take the discrimination element seriously. In one paragraph
of the opinion, the Court gave some examples of how the discrimination element
might be met, but that was the extent of its discussion. 6 In sum, the tea leaves left
by Oncale indicate that the discrimination element is to be taken seriously, but
provide little guidance on how renewed attention to the element will affect sexual
harassment doctrine.1
7
14 The Court cited Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616
(1987), Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983), and
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), as examples of nonharassment cases in which
the Court rejected a presumption that a member of one protected group would not
discriminate against a member of that same group. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001-02.
Relying on these cases, the Court then held that nothing in Title VII bars a claim of
discrimination "merely because the plaintiff and the defendant (or the person charged with
acting on behalf of the defendant) are of the same sex." Id
'" This emphasis in the Court's opinion was foreshadowed by the oral argument in the
case in which virtually all of the questioning focused on the discrimination element. See
Transcript of Oral Argument, Oncale, 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (No. 96-568), available in 1997
WL 751912 (Dec. 3, 1997).
16 The Court stated:
Courts and juries have found the inference of discrimination easy to draw
in most male-female sexual harassment situations, because the challenged
conduct typically involves explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity; it is
reasonable to assume those proposals would not have been made to someone of
the same sex. The same chain of inference would be available to a plaintiff
alleging same-sex harassment, if there were credible evidence that the harasser
was homosexual. But harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire
to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex. A trier of fact might
reasonably find such discrimination, for example, if a female victim is harassed
in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman as to make it clear
that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in
the workplace. A same-sex harassment plaintiff may also, of course, offer direct
comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both
sexes in a mixed-sex workplace. Whatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses
to follow, he or she must always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely
tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted
"discrimina[tion] ... because of... sex."
Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002 (quoting Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(I) (1994)).
'" Plaintiffs attorney, Nicholas Canaday II1, complained about this lack of clarity. In an
interview with the Bureau of National Affairs, he said that the opinion left him "wondering
what the court meant about the standards of proof in a same-sex setting.... How does one
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II. TAKING DISCRIMINATION SERIOUSLY IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
Oncale notwithstanding, the current approach to sexual harassment pays little
attention to the discrimination element. Under some articulations of this approach,
no direct attention whatsoever is paid to the issue of whether discrimination is
present; under other articulations, formal attention is paid to the issue, but in most
cases a presumption of discrimination applies which makes actual proof of the
element unnecessary. Because they are so widely accepted, I call these variants of
the current approach the "standard model" of sexual harassment. This section will
present and examine these aspects of the standard model, and compare the standard
model with a revised, discrimination-centered model of sexual harassment which
takes the discrimination element more seriously.
A. Discrimination and the Standard Model of Sexual Harassment
The standard model comes in two basic forms, but both underemphasize the
discrimination element. In the first form of the standard model, followed in the Ninth
Circuit, discrimination is not even an explicit element of a sexual harassment cause
of action. In the second form, discrimination is listed as one of the elements of a
cause of action, but in most cases the presence of discrimination is assumed. More
specifically, in this second form, if the harassment involves a person of one sex
harassing someone of the opposite sex, discrimination is assumed. Although this
assumption covers the vast majority of the cases, it is what caused the problem in
Oncale. The problem in Oncale, which had split the circuits, was what to do with
the assumption of sex discrimination when the harassment involved people of the
same sex.'8
The standard model, as applied in the Ninth Circuit, eliminates discrimination
as an element of a sexual harassment cause of action. In the Ninth Circuit, the
elements are:
prove the 'because of sex' requirement?" Bodell, supra note 6, at A-4.
I" Prior to the Court's decision in Oncale, some circuits had held that same-sex cases
never could present a cognizable harassment case under Title VII. See Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 120 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 998
(1998); Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. II1. 1988). Others had held that
same-sex cases could present cognizable harassment claims if the harasser were homosexual.
See McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996);
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996). Still other circuits had held
that harassment that is sexual in content would be actionable regardless of the harasser's sex
or sexual orientation. See Doe v. City of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997),
vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998). The Court in Oncale cited all of these cases.
See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
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1) that the plaintiff was subjected to sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature;
2) that the conduct was unwelcome; and
3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of employment and create an abusive working
environment. 9
In this version of the standard model, the first element is the only one that
potentially addresses discrimination. But that element addresses discrimination only
very indirectly. The question asked is not "is there discrimination?," but rather "is
there verbal or physical contact of a sexual nature?" The focus is on the content of
the words or conduct, not on whether the actor discriminated on the basis of sex.
Because "verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature" also may be evidence
of sex discrimination, one could argue that discrimination is required in this version
'9 See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875-76 (9th Cir. 1991); Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d
1368, 1373 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989). These, obviously, are the
elements of a hostile environment sexual harassment claim. The elements of a quid pro quo
claim are the same, except that the last element requires proof that the harassment affected
a tangible aspect of employment, rather than proof that the harassment was severe or
pervasive. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2264 (1998). That change
does not affect the model's treatment of the discrimination element. Influential commentators
also have failed to include discrimination when listing the elements of a harassment cause of
action. See 1 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 8.7, at 357 (2d
ed. 1988) ("[S]exual harassment exists when there is a pattern of sexually oriented conduct,
ranging from offensive touchings to sexually related comments and jokes that create a
'contaminated work environment.... "'); REBECCA HANNER WHITE, EMPLOYMENT LAW AND
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 95-96 (1998) ("A hostile work environment claim is stated
if the plaintiff can show unwelcome sexual conduct that is... 'severe or pervasive .... '").
Two points are worth noting here on the distinction between quid pro quo and hostile
environment cases. First, the Supreme Court's criticism of the distinction in two of its recent
decisions was directed at its use in determining employer liability for illegal harassment, not
its use in determining whether harassment exists. In both cases, the Court recognized the
utility of the distinction in deciding whether harassment had occurred, even though it was
determined to be largely irrelevant to the issue of employer liability. See Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2292-93 (1998); Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2264-65. Second, the
distinction between quid pro quo and hostile environment cases depends on whether a
"tangible" aspect of employment has been affected by the discrimination. "Tangible" is used
here as a term of art deriving from the Supreme Court cases and referring to any concrete
employment practice, such as "hiring, firing, promotion, compensation, and work
assignment." Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2284. The distinction between quid pro quo and hostile
environment cases is not watertight and an argument can be, and has been, made that the
distinction should be rejected, see Eugene Scalia, The Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo
Sexual Harassment, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 307 (1998), but consideration of that issue
is beyond the scope of this Article.
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of the standard model. Rather than requiring direct proof of discrimination, the
model allows proof of a proxy---"verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature"--instead." This argument is weak, however, because the "verbal or physical
conduct" requirement is an imperfect proxy for discrimination.2' On the one hand,
much conduct "of a sexual nature" is not discriminatory. For example, the Loch
Ness Monster of harassment hypotheticals-the bisexual supervisor who makes
sexual advances toward both male and female employees-involves conduct which
is very much "of a sexual nature," but which is not discriminatory because, by
assumption, the supervisor approaches men and women equally.22 Similarly, if the
harassing conduct is the ubiquitous display of sexually suggestive posters,23 the
conduct certainly would fall within the category of conduct "of a sexual nature," but
20 Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1746-47
(1998).
2 A Venn diagram provides a useful way of thinking about this concept. Circle A, below,
represents every situation in which there is "verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature."
Circle B represents every harassment situation in which there is discrimination on the basis
of sex. If the two circles overlapped completely, the "of a sexual nature" element would be
a perfect proxy for discrimination. The rest of the paragraph in the text, however, explains
why the two circles do not overlap completely. Area I in the diagram represents situations
in which there is conduct of a sexual nature that is not discrimination. Area 3 represents
situations in which there is discrimination that is not conduct of a sexual nature. The larger
those two areas are, in relation to the area of overlap (Area 2), the less perfect the proxy.
A B
22 This is the Loch Ness Monster of sexual harassment law because, even though the issue
is discussed often in the literature and occasionally in the case law, a real-life bisexual
harasser has yet to be sighted. Courts have considered, with mixed results, the analogous
situation of a supervisor who, although not bisexual, is equally obnoxious to both sexes.
Compare Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1082 (1995), and Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Wyo.
1993) (finding discrimination), with Johnston v. Tower Air, Inc., 149 F.R.D. 461 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (finding no discrimination).
23 See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla.
1991), discussed infra note 184.
1999]
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whether there is discrimination is a much closer question.24 The match between
"verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature" and discrimination also is quite
imperfect on the other side of the equation: much harassing conduct that is
discriminatory is not "verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature." The cases
provide many examples, such as the female plumber who had cockroaches placed in
her hair and pants and was presented with a decapitated cat,' and the female police
officers whose skin was burned when lime was placed in their uniforms.26
The second form of the standard model requires proof of an additional
element-that the discrimination is "based on sex., 27 Although this form of the
model, in contrast to the first form, requires attention to discrimination as an element
of a harassment cause of action, the attention usually is only formal. When the
harassment is opposite-sex 2' and the conduct is of a sexual nature,29 courts apply the
24 See infra text accompanying notes 182-86.
25 See Egger v. Local 276, Plumbers & Pipefitiers Union, 644 F. Supp. 795, 798 (D.
Mass. 1986), affd sub nom. Hallquist v. Local 276, Plumbers & Pipefitters Union, 843 F.2d
18 (1st Cir. 1988).
216 See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1474 (3d Cir. 1990). For other
examples, see Schultz, supra note 20, at 1762-69.
27 This is the version of the standard model followed in most jurisdictions. See 15
LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 88.04, at 88-233 to 88-
234 (1998) (citing supporting cases from every federal circuit except the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits).
28 See, e.g., Doe v. City of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563, 574-75 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated
and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998). The Seventh Circuit commented:
Title VII bars an employer from discriminating against an employee
because of her sex, and thus... courts typically require a plaintiff complaining
of sex discrimination, including sexual harassment, to demonstrate that the
discrimination occurred "because of' her gender. This requirement has not
detained courts long in cases of opposite-sex harassment; it is generally taken as
a given that when a female employee is harassed in explicitly sexual ways by a
male worker or workers, she has been discriminated against "because of' her
sex. But courts by and large have been unwilling to make the same assumption
when a man harasses another man in the workplace, however rife the harassment
may be with sexual innuendo, sexual contact, and other conduct of an explicitly
sexual nature. They have looked instead for proof, above and beyond the sexual
content of the harassment itself, that the plaintiff was singled out for harassment
because of his gender.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 752 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996); McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors,
72 F.3d 1191, 1195 n.5 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996).
29 See, e.g., Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439,449 (3d Cir. 1994). The Third Circuit noted:
In reaching our conclusion ... we have paid particular attention to the distinction
... between sexual misconduct in which the intent to discriminate "is implicit,
and thus should be recognized as a matter of course" and "actions [which] are
not sexual by their very nature."... Accordingly, where an employee claims sex
[Vol. 7:3
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oft-noted heterosexual presumption.3" That is, courts find that the "based on sex"
element is met without any proof of actual discrimination. As Professor Schultz has
noted, this approach has resulted in a two-tiered model of sexual harassment in which
a presumption that the harassing conduct is "based on sex" applies in most, but not
all, cases.3" As indicated, the cases that cannot take advantage of the presumption are
same-sex cases and cases involving conduct that is not "of a sexual nature." In those
cases, some actual proof of discrimination is necessary to establish a cause of
action."
Analytically, it is useful to consider separately the two categories excluded from
the heterosexual presumption: cases in which the conduct is not "of a sexual nature"
and same-sex cases. The first category emphasizes the extent to which the "of a
sexual nature" element substitutes for proof of discrimination. If the conduct is "of
discrimination predicated on sexually neutral conduct it may be necessary for the
employee to establish that the employer's motives for its actions were sexual. If
the discrimination of which Spain complained was predicated merely on the
demands for loans, her case might be of that nature.
However, Spain's allegations are not predicated on sexually neutral
conduct. Rather, she alleges that the harassment resulted from the rumors that
she was having an affair with Nelson. Thus, the harassment directed against her
as a woman had a sexual orientation by its very nature.
Id. (quoting Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482 n.3) (citation omitted)..In full, the Andrews note
reads:
The intent to discriminate on the basis of sex in cases involving sexual
propositions, innuendo, pornographic materials, or sexual derogatory language
is implicit, and thus should be recognized as a matter of course. A more fact
intensive analysis will be necessary where the actions are not sexual by their very
nature.
Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482 n.3.
30 See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 19, § 8.7.1 (2d ed. Supp. 1996); Carolyn Grose,
Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: Subverting the Heterosexist Paradigm of Title VII, 7 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 375 (1995); Ramona L. Paetzold, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: Can It Be
Sex-Related for Purposes of Title VII?, I EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPL. POL'Y J. 25, 48-56
(1997); Richard F. Storrow, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims After Oncale: Defining the
Boundaries ofActionable Conduct, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 677, 736-42 (1998). Cf Leigh Megan
Leonard, A Missing Voice in Feminist Legal Theory: The Heterosexual Presumption, 12
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 39 (1990) (criticizing feminist legal theorists for unconsciously
employing a presumption of heterosexuality).
31 See Schultz, supra note 20, at 1739-44.
32 Narrowly read, the Oncale decision does nothing to undermine this two-tiered
structure. Oncale holds only that there must be actual proof of discrimination in same-sex
cases, which always was the case under the two-tiered structure. See Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998). Oncale does not say directly that the
presumption of discrimination cannot apply in other cases. This Article argues that Oncale
should be read to require proof of discrimination in every harassment case, not only in same-
sex cases;
1999]
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a sexual nature," then by presumption discrimination also exists. On the other hand,
if the conduct is not "of a sexual nature," one is left with a simple disparate treatment
case in which discrimination must be proven in some other way. The second
category illustrates the intuition underlying the heterosexual presumption:
discrimination occurs between people of the opposite sex, not between people of the
same sex." As a result, conduct "of a sexual nature" is sufficient to justify a
presumption of discrimination in opposite-sex cases, but not in same-sex cases. In
same-sex cases something more is required: actual proof of discrimination.34
Ironically, when the heterosexual presumption does not apply, courts often
require discrimination to be proven too exactingly. Rather than applying the mixed-
motives model used elsewhere in discrimination law," courts often closely parse the
possible motivations for the harassment and reject discrimination as the cause if other
plausible motivations exist. In Mc Williams v. Fairfax County Board ofSupervisors,"
for example, a male was harassed by other males. They teased him, asked him about
his sexual activities, exposed themselves to him, put a condom in his food, and
physically assaulted him." Instead of allowing the jury to decide whether the
conduct was motivated at least in part by sex, 38 the court affirmed summary judgment
for the employer:
We believe this result compelled by a commonsense reading of the
critical causation language of the statute: "because of the [claimant's]
sex". As a purely semantic matter, we do not believe that in common
understanding the kind of shameful heterosexual-male-on-heterosexual-
male conduct alleged here (nor comparable female-on-female conduct) is
considered to be "because of the [target's] 'sex."' Perhaps "because of'
the victim's known or believed prudery, or shyness, or other form of
vulnerability to sexually-focused speech or conduct. Perhaps "because
of' the perpetrators' own sexual perversion, or obsession, or insecurity.
3' The majority in Oncale specifically rejected this intuition. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at
1001-02.
34 Professor Paetzold has rejected this line of reasoning, concluding that conduct of a
sexual nature justifies a presumption of discrimination in both opposite-sex and same-sex
cases. See Paetzold, supra note 30, at 61-62. As discussed below, I also reject this line of
reasoning, but my conclusion is that the presumption should be rejected in both cases; in both
cases, discrimination is a crucial element and should be proven directly. See infra text
accompanying notes 60-61.
3' For an application of the mixed-motives model in sexual harassment cases, see infra
text accompanying notes 45-56.
36 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 819 (1996).
31 See id. at 1194.
" This is the question that would be asked under the mixed-motives model. See infra text
accompanying notes 46-53.
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Certainly, "because of" their vulgarity and insensitivity and meanness of
spirit. But not specifically "because of" the victim's sex."
This type of searching inquiry for the "true" reason for the conduct is not what occurs
elsewhere in discrimination law when conduct potentially is driven by multiple
motives. Elsewhere, if the conduct was motivated in part by sex and in part by the
victim's prudery and vulnerability, then the plaintiff would have presented a prima
facie case and the burden would shift to the employer to prove that the same conduct
would have occurred even absent sex as a motivation." At the very least, when sex
and other plausible reasons for the harassing conduct exist, ajury should be permitted
to determine if sex was a motivating factor.4
In sum, two forms of the standard model for proving sexual harassment exist.
The first form eliminates the discrimination requirement entirely. The second form
retains discrimination as a formal element in the model, but fails to calibrate the
discrimination inquiry appropriately. In most cases, courts use the heterosexual
presumption to eliminate any need to present independent proof of discrimination.
In other cases, courts should use the mixed motives model to analyze the
discrimination issue, but reject discrimination if any other plausible motivation
exists.42
The under-emphasis on discrimination in the standard model has caused
commentators, with justification, to treat sexual harassment as a completely separate
model of discrimination with its own principles, justifications, and legal standards.43
Sexual harassment is neither disparate treatment nor disparate impact, but a cause of
19 McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195-96. For another case using an overly exacting inquiry,
see Polly v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 825 F. Supp. 135 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
40 See infra text accompanying notes 45-58.
See Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 342-43 (2d Cir. 1998) (arguing that juries are
the appropriate fact-finders in sexual harassment cases because of the highly contextualized
nature of the inquiry).
42 It is important to note that these categories are not airtight. Even though in many cases
courts use the heterosexual presumption and require little or no proof of actual
discrimination, in other cases that might fall into the category courts have attempted to
determine if discrimination is present. See, e.g., Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428
(7th Cir. 1995); Wimberly v. Shoney's, Inc., 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 444 (S.D. Ga.
1985). Similarly, in cases that fall outside the normal scope of the heterosexual presumption,
courts sometimes use a similar presumption. See, e.g., Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville,
Inc., 107 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 1997); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th
Cir. 1996). The categories discussed in the text provide a useful way of organizing the bulk
of the cases, but many cases defy the general rules.
41 See RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVEN L. WILLBORN, THE STATISTICS OF
DISCRIMINATION: USING STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN DISCRIMINATION CASES § 1.10, at 1-23
(1996); SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 19, § 8.7, at 255-56 (2d ed. Supp. 1996); Cass R.
Sunstein, Feminism andLegal Theory, 101 HARV. L. REV. 826, 829 (1988).
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action independent of their requirements and, indeed, independent from the language
of Title VII. The standard model treats sexual harassment law as exceptional.
B. A Discrimination-Centered Model of Sexual Harassment
Oncale suggests a refocus on discrimination in sexual harassment cases. This
section follows that suggestion by presenting a model of sexual harassment that treats
discrimination seriously. This discrimination-centered model reconnects harassment
law to the language of Title VII and, in doing so, to the concepts of discrimination
that apply elsewhere in discrimination law. This section first presents the
discrimination-centered model affirmatively and then considers the extent to which
the elements of the standard model of harassment survive within a model that
emphasizes discrimination and fidelity to the statutory language.
As with any statutory cause of action, the place to begin is with the language of
the statute. Sexual harassment cases are based on section 703(a)(1) of Title VII: it
is illegal for an employer "to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's ... sex . . . ."" This language contains two elements that must be
satisfied in every Title VII case: (1) discrimination on the basis of sex, and (2) an
effect on compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. The first
step in reconnecting sexual harassment law to the rest of discrimination law is to
consider what a sexual harassment cause of action would look like if it followed the
Title VII framework.
Courts using a discrimination-centered approach to sexual harassment would use
the same framework for analyzing the discrimination element that they use in other
disparate treatment cases.45 Specifically, they should use Title VII's mixed-
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1994).
4 The disparate impact model is generally inapplicable in harassment cases. The courts
have recognized this implicitly by basing their decisions in harassment cases on § 703(a)(1)
of Title VII, the section that prohibits disparate treatment discrimination, rather than §
703(a)(2), which prohibits disparate impact discrimination. See infra note 76 and
accompanying text. But, even if that were not the case, the disparate impact model generally
does not apply to harassment situations because it is ill-suited to them. The first step in a
disparate impact case is to identify a factor that is sex-neutral on its face, such as a test or a
height'and weight requirement. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977) (disparate impact cases "involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their
treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another").
This step is important because it differentiates between employers who are entitled to the
more lenient business necessity defense and employers who are subject to the more stringent
bona fide occupational qualification defense. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 19, § 3.6.1,
at 105. Harassment cases fail to satisfy the first step of the disparate impact model because
the conduct being challenged generally is not sex neutral. Harassment cases also fit poorly
into later steps of a disparate impact analysis. A disparate impact generally is shown by
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motives model,46 which permits plaintiffs to prevail partially if they can demonstrate
demonstrating that women are disproportionately screened out by the neutral factor. In
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), for example, height and weight requirements
eliminated a much higher proportion of women than men from the positions in question. It
is conceivable that plaintiffs could attempt to show that "neutral" harassing conduct
disproportionately affected women. For example, if an employer permitted a work
environment to be plastered with sex-oriented posters, women could attempt to demonstrate
that women quit in disproportionate numbers because of the environment or that women, but
not men, perceived the posters to be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the working
environment. But I know of no harassment case that has attempted to establish disparate
impact in such a manner, in part because the claim of disparate treatment discrimination is
much more straightforward, and in part because evidence of this type of disparate impact is
difficult to gather and present. Finally, the business necessity stage of a disparate impact case
simply does not compute as applied to harassment situations. It is difficult to imagine any
harassing conduct that could be "job related for the position in question and consistent with
business necessity." Title VII, § 703(k)(1)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i).
46 This model derives from the Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), and was modified and codified by the Civil Rights Act of
1991, Title VII, §§ 703(m), 706(g)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
The mixed-motives model is one of two models that apply to individual disparate
treatment cases. The other model is the "pretext" model based on McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The mixed-motives model is the appropriate one to use in this
context, however, because it applies when multiple motives may have caused the conduct in
question. Multiple potential motives always are present in sexual harassment cases. Cases
subsequent to Price Waterhouse also have held that the mixed-motives model applies only
when "direct evidence" of discrimination is present. See Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock
Chem. Co., 29 F.3d 1078 (6th Cir. 1994); Hook v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366 (3d Cir.
1994). See generally Steven M. Tindall, Note, Do As She Does, Not As She Says: The
Shortcomings of Justice O'Connor's Direct Evidence Requirement in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 332 (1996) (examining case law applying Justice
O'Connor's "direct evidence" standard and arguing that she did not intend the traditional
meaning of "direct evidence" to apply, but rather intended "direct evidence" to mean
evidence of an employer's discriminatory perspective which is related both temporally and
logically to the employment decision); Developments in the Law: Employment
Discrimination, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1568, 1581-86 (1996) (discussing recent application of
the direct evidence standard and stating that "the vast majority of cases that follow the direct
[evidence] route [of showing disparate treatment in employment discrimination cases] fall
under the 'mixed motives' paradigm." Id at 1581.). Although this is an incorrect reading of
Price Waterhouse and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see infra note 50, the "direct evidence"
distinction also indicates that the mixed-motives model ought to apply in sexual harassment
cases. These cases almost always involve "direct evidence" of discrimination, often in the
form of sexually suggestive conduct.
Although the subject is beyond the scope of this Article, I agree with those who argue
that the mixed-motives model makes the McDonnell Douglas model superfluous and,
consequently, that the McDonnell Douglas model should be rejected. See Deborah C.
Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2229, 2311 -
24 & n.291 (1995).
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that sex was a "motivating factor for any employment practice."47 The model,
however, permits an employer to avoid full liability if the employer can demonstrate
that it would have made the same employment decision even if sex had not entered
into the decision-making process.4"
The mixed-motives model, however, must be applied with care because it was
developed in a different context and with a particular issue in mind. 9 The plaintiff
bears the initial burden of proving discrimination: the plaintiff must show that sex
was a motivating factor for an employment decision. This is a generous interpretation
of the burden to prove discrimination. The plaintiff need not prove that sex was a
tipping or even a predominant factor in the decision, only that it was a "motivating"
factor." Harassment cases requiring an overly exacting proof of discrimination
should be rejected in favor of the "motivating" standard of the mixed-motives
model. " But to say that the burden of proving discrimination is generous is not to
say that it need not be proven. The "heterosexual presumption" also should be
rejected." Discrimination must be proven in harassment cases in the same way it is
in other cases-generally, by careful consideration of whether women are or would
be treated differently than similarly situated men. The sexual content of the conduct
4' Title VII, § 703(m), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
48 See id § 706(g)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
4' As noted, the seminal case on the mixed-motives model was Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). The factual context of Price Waterhouse involved not
harassment, but promotion to partnership. The primary issue in the case was the proper
analysis when two or more plausible motives may have caused an adverse outcome. In
contrast, in many hostile environment harassment cases, the primary issue is whether a legally
cognizable adverse outcome is present, that is, was the harassment sufficiently severe or
pervasive to qualify as an adverse outcome.
50 Title VII § 703(m), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). In enacting this language, Congress
adopted the standard used by the plurality in Price Waterhouse. See Price Waterhouse, 490
U.S. at 250-52. By choosing that standard, Congress rejected the alternative standard
proposed by Justice O'Connor in her concurrence: "direct evidence that an illegitimate
criterion was a substantial factor in the decision." Id at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring). A9
a result, a motivating factor can be based on "indirect" evidence and does not need to be a
"substantial factor" in the decision. At the same time, however, both the plurality and Justice
O'Connor agreed that evidence of isolated or "stray" remarks about a person's protected
status would not meet the motivating factor standard. See id at 251-52 (Brennan, J., plurality
opinion); id at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
5' See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
52 See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text. Similarly, the claim that the
heterosexual presumption should be extended to all harassment cases, instead of being
confined only to opposite-sex cases, also should be rejected. See Paetzold, supra note 30.
The central claim of this Article is that presumptions of discrimination should be rejected in
all harassment cases. Instead, discrimination in harassment cases must be proven as it must
be in all other types of discrimination cases and in the same way that it is proven in other
types of cases.
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normally would be a relevant factor in making the discrimination determination, but
it is only a factor; the issue is whether sex motivated the conduct. The ultimate issue
is whether discrimination was present.53
The employer's burden in a mixed-motives case goes to the second element of
a Title VII cause of action-the discrimination must affect a term or condition of
employment-but, in this context, it is important to specify carefully the relationship
between the two. Because the plaintiff recovers in a mixed-motives suit even when
the employer successfully meets its burden, 4 the model recognizes that conduct can
meet Title VII's "affect" requirement even if no employment decision would have
been different if sex had not been considered. Sex "affected" a term or condition of
employment when the employer used it as a motivating factor in making the
employment decision. No additional proof is required. The employer's burden,
which is in the remedies section of Title VII, merely acknowledges that a plaintiff
cannot recover damages or other personal relief for an employment decision, even
though it was "affected" by sex, unless the employer's consideration of sex also
changed the decision.
In the typical mixed-motives case, no dispute exists about whether an adverse
employment decision has been made. For example, in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins," the seminal mixed-motives case, it was undisputed that the plaintiff was
denied partnership. The central issues in the typical case are whether sex played a
role in the decision and, if so, whether the same employment decision would have
been made even if sex had not played a role. Quid pro quo harassment cases fit very
nicely into this framework. Generally, there is no dispute that the employer has made
an adverse employment decision, for example, to deny a pay raise or promotion. The
relevant questions are the same as in other mixed-motives cases: did sex play a role
in the employment decision and, if so, would the employment decision have been the
same even if sex had not played a role? Quid pro quo cases, then, are like Price
" Although it is crucial to ask the right question, I do not mean to imply at all that
answering the question always will be easy. Fact-finders often will be called upon to make
very subtle distinctions in deciding whether sex was a motivating factor. See, e.g., Penry v.
Federal Home Loan Bank, 155 F.3d 1257, 1258 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that acts of
describing a mall roof in sexually-suggestive terms and taking plaintiff to a Hooters
restaurant was relevant in determining whether conduct was motivated by sex); Winsor v.
Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 1000-01 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding sexual harassment,
even though the ultimate reason for the harassment was professional jealousy, because the
form the abuse took was motivated in part by the plaintiffs sex); Galloway v. General
Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1167-68 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the
words used to abuse the plaintiff, such as "sick bitch," were not sufficiently gendered to
constitute sex discrimination).
14 See Title VII § 706(g)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
55 490 U.S. 228 (1989). See discussion supra notes 46, 49-50.
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Waterhouse itself, in which it was undisputed that a term or condition of employment
was affected; the crucial issue was what motivated the employment decision. 6
Hostile environment cases, on the other hand, often will present the issue of
whether any employment practice was affected by the conduct at issue. By
definition, no tangible aspect of employment has been affected. But the standard
model of sexual harassment correctly recognizes an alternate route for meeting the
"affect" element: harassment can be sufficiently severe or pervasive to "affect" the
working environment. Thus, if the harassing conduct was discriminatory (in the
sense that sex was a factor motivating the conduct) and if it was sufficiently severe
or pervasive to affect the working environment, both elements of a discrimination-
centered model of sexual harassment have been met.57 On the other hand, if the
conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive, no harassment cause of action
would exist even if the harassment was motivated by sex.
This analysis of quid pro quo and hostile environment cases emphasizes that a
Title VII cause of action requires proof of two basic elements: discrimination and an
effect on a term or condition of employment. In quid pro quo cases, it is undisputed
that a term or condition of employment has been affected." The only remaining
question is whether discrimination caused the change: was sex one of the factors
motivating the change in the term or condition? If it was, the employer is liable,
although it can reduce the extent of its liability by proving that the same change
would have been made even if sex had not been a causative factor. In hostile
environment cases, in contrast, the issue of whether the conduct affects a term or
condition of employment is in dispute. The plaintiff must prove the element by
demonstrating that the conduct was severe or pervasive. Even if the harassing
56 This point is not undermined by the existence of mixed-motives or quid pro quo cases
which contain a dispute about whether a term or condition of employment has been affected.
Such cases undoubtedly exist. The point here is not that such cases do not exist, but rather
that the crucial issue in these cases generally lies elsewhere.
" At this point in the mixed-motives model, the employer would have an opportunity to
limit its liability by proving that the same employment outcome (the abusive working
environment) would have occurred even if sex had not motivated the conduct. Although
theoretically possible, it is quite unlikely that an employer would ever be able to meet this
burden. The employer would have to prove that the environment would have been abusive
even if the severe or pervasive harassing conduct had not occurred.
5 In a very real sense, of course, this determination is merely definitional: a case is a quid
pro quo case only if a term or condition of employment has been affected; otherwise it is a
hostile environment case. This merely serves to emphasize the primary point, however. The
attempt to fit a case within the quid pro quo paradigm should be viewed as one part of the
plaintiff's attempt to prove the "affects" element of a Title VII case. (The other part is to
prove causation.) If the plaintiff fails to fit within the quid pro quo paradigm, he or she must
prove that a term or condition of employment has been affected by demonstrating that the
sex-based conduct was severe or pervasive.
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conduct was motivated by sex, if it did not affect a term or condition of employment
(if it was not severe or pervasive), it does not violate Title VII.
This discrimination-centered model of sexual harassment requires a
reconsideration of the elements in the standard model. As just indicated, the "severe
or pervasive" element in the standard sexual harassment analysis is easy to place
within the discrimination-centered model. This element is used only in hostile
environment cases, as the alternative to the "affect a tangible aspect of employment"
element in quid pro quo cases. Consequently, it addresses the second element of a
Title VII cause of action. Not all discrimination necessarily "affects" a term,
condition, or privilege of employment. In quid pro quo cases, the claim is that
discrimination directly affected a term or condition. Otherwise, the conduct must rise
to a certain level-to the level of "severe or pervasive" conduct-to meet Title VII's
requirement of affect on a term or condition of employment.59
The requirement of "sexual conduct" in the standard model relates to Title VII's
discrimination element. But, as noted above, the requirement does not correlate very
well with the "discrimination" element: "sexual conduct" can occur when no
"discrimination" is present, and "discrimination" can occur when no "sexual
conduct" is present.60 "Sexual conduct" should be rejected as an element of a
harassment cause of action in favor of discrimination. This proposition does not
mean that "sexual conduct," as the term is understood in the standard model, is
irrelevant. Instead, it means that sexual conduct is relegated from an element of a
harassment cause of action to one type of evidence relevant to the discrimination
issue.
Similarly, the "based on sex" element in most articulations of the standard model
should be retained, but strengthened. Instead of relying on the heterosexual
presumption in most cases, actual proof of discrimination should be required in every
case. But it is very important to emphasize how lenient the standard is to prove
discrimination. If sex is a motivating factor, then the discrimination element is met.
Courts need not and should not carefully sort the possible motivations and reject a
finding of discrimination if another possibility exists.6' Instead, courts merely should
determine if sex was one of the motivating factors. At that point, the employer bears
the burden of proving that the same employment result would have occurred even if
sex had not entered into the decision. In a quid pro quo case, this would require a
showing that the employer's decision regarding promotion, pay, or other tangible
effect would have been the same even if sex had not affected the decision-making.
In hostile environment cases, the employer's burden would be the impossible one of
9 The Supreme Court has been quite clear that this is the role played by the "severe or
pervasive" element. See infra notes 79-80, 88-89, 99-100 and accompanying text.
6 See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
61 See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
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proving that the work environment would have been abusive even if the severe or
pervasive conduct had not occurred.62
The "unwelcomeness" element is the most difficult to place within the
discrimination-centered framework. In the standard model, the element applies in
both quid pro quo and hostile environment cases. Because it applies in quid pro quo
cases in which a term or condition of employment is affected by definition, the
element appears to address the discrimination element instead.63 But this result raises
two independent problems. First, as a part of the discrimination element,
unwelcomeness focuses on the wrong party. Instead of focusing on the actions of the
perpetrator to determine if they are the product of discrimination, it focuses on the
reactions of the victim. Precisely the same conduct undertaken with the same intent
by a perpetrator may or may not be discrimination, depending on whether the conduct
was or was not welcomed by the victim." This does not fit within the normal or legal
understandings of the meaning of discrimination, which focus on the perpetrator's
conduct. Second, when the perpetrator's conduct is discriminatory but not
unwelcome, the element becomes, in effect, a consent defense to conduct that
62 See supra note 57. The focus here is only on the discrimination element and, thus,
assumes that the "affects" element has been met by proving that the conduct was severe or
pervasive.
63 Unwelcomeness may have an impact on the "affecting a term or condition" element of
a Title VII action in hostile environment cases. The rationale may be that even severe or
pervasive sexual conduct does not adversely affect the work environment if the plaintiff is
an active participant in the conduct who does not find it unwelcome. See Reed v. Shepard,
939 F.2d 484,491 (7th Cir. 1991); Balletti v. Sun-Sentinel Co., 909 F. Supp. 1539 (S.D. Fla.
1995). If this were the role of unwelcomeness in harassment analysis, however, the
requirement would not be applied in quid pro quo cases, in which the "term or condition"
requirement is met directly.
64 It is worth noting that this discrepancy would not be a problem if unwelcomeness went
to the "affects" element of a Title VII claim. On that element, the focus appropriately is on
the victim: has a "tangible aspect" of the victim's employment been affected? Has the
victim's working environment been adversely affected? But, as noted in the text and the
preceding footnote, unwelcomeness applies in both quid pro quo and hostile environment
cases and, hence, cannot be limited to the "affects" element.
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otherwise would be illegal discrimination.65 In every other context, victim consent
is not a defense to a claim of discrimination."
In a discrimination-centered framework, unwelcomeness is viewed most
appropriately as a factor relevant, not to the discrimination element, but to the
"affects" element .6 This would mean that unwelcomeness would have no role in
65 Another way to think about these two problems with the "unwelcomeness" element is
to consider all four possibilities:
Discrimination No Discrimination
Unwelcome
Not
Unwelcome
In Box A, the conduct is illegal because it is both unwelcome and discriminatory. Box
B illustrates the first problem with the unwelcomeness element: if conduct falling into the box
is harassment, then the unwelcomeness element is a substitute for the discrimination element
even though it focuses on the wrong party. Box C illustrates the second problem with the
unwelcomeness element: if conduct falling into the box is not harassment (because it fails the
unwelcomeness element), then unwelcomeness is a defense to conduct that would otherwise
be illegal discrimination. In Box D, there would be no claim because neither element is
satisfied.
6 The only possible exception to this rule are the very carefully crafted and limited
waiver provisions of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act ("OWBPA"). See Age
Discrimination in Employment Act § 7(f), 29 U.S.C. § 626(0 (1994) ("ADEA"); see also
Michael C. Harper, Age-Based Exit Incentives, Coercion, and the Prospective Waiver of
ADEA Rights: The Failure of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, 79 VA. L. REV.
1271, 1272-73 (1993) (asserting that the waiver provisions of the OWBPA "reflect a general
acceptance of... age-based exit incentives," which "can be an effective means of thwarting
achievement of the ADEA's goals"). Waiver under the ADEA clearly is distinguishable from
the implicit waiver of the unwelcomeness requirement. Under the ADEA, waiver is
authorized explicitly by the statute, in response to narrow and specific employer concerns,
and subject to a long list of specific notice and other requirements. None of these factors are
present in the unwelcomeness element.
67 Another way of thinking about this relationship is that unwelcomeness is relevant to
the issue of whether harm has occurred. As in many tort-based actions, harm is an essential
element of an harassment cause of action. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
& KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing the elements of negligence-
based causes of action). In quid pro quo cases, the unwelcomeness inquiry is irrelevant
because harm has been proven directly by showing that a "tangible aspect of employment"
has been adversely affected. In hostile environment cases, the claim would be that a plaintiff
who welcomes harassing conduct has not been harmed by the harassment. Similarly, an
analogy could be made to assault in tort law in which the responses of the victim must be
taken into account in determining liability. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict
A B
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quid pro quo cases. Proof that discriminatory conduct adversely affected a tangible
aspect of employment is direct and sufficient proof that the element has been met.
Whether the victim welcomed the discriminatory conduct is irrelevant.
Unwelcomeness, however, would play an indirect role in hostile environment cases.
When the claim is that the discriminatory conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the working environment, the environment of a victim who welcomes the
conduct may not have been altered sufficiently to meet the "affect" element.6"
Consequently, as with "sexual conduct," unwelcomeness should be viewed as a
factor relevant to an essential element of a harassment cause of action (the "affect"
element), rather than as an element itself.69
In summary, a discrimination-centered model of sexual harassment would focus
on the two elements required in every Title VII cause of action: discrimination and
an effect on a term or condition of employment.7' Discrimination would be analyzed
Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 172-73 (1973). Limiting the relevance of unwelcomeness
also makes sense from this tort perspective because, as with intentional torts, the costs to the
injurer of avoiding the injury are negative. Even if there is only limited harm to the victim
because the conduct is not unwelcome, society gains if the law discourages injurers from
expending resources to inflict such harm. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Theory ofIntentional Torts, 1 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 127 (1981).
68 Analyzed in this way, the unwelcomeness inquiry merely is one application of the now
familiar principle that relational problems should be viewed reciprocally. That is, one should
analyze relational problems by considering both the actor "causing" the problem and the
susceptibility of the other actor. Cf R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON.
1, 2 (1960). The situation here is the converse of the normal situation in which the principle
is applied. Ordinarily, the principle is applied to limit the ability of overly susceptible
plaintiffs to recover. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 67, §§ 10, 12. In sexual harassment
cases, the principle normally would be applied to preclude recovery by women who are
especially resistant to the defendant's conduct. The overarching principle, however, is the
same: the situation should be analyzed considering both actors.
69 This position is similar to the well-known position of Professor Susan Estrich that
unwelcomeness should be rejected as an element in both quid pro quo and hostile
environment cases. See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 826-34 (1991).
I agree that unwelcomeness should be rejected as an element in both types of cases. In
addition, Professor Estrich and I agree that unwelcomeness should be irrelevant in quid pro
quo cases. In contrast to Professor Estrich, however, I recognize that evidence of
unwelcomeness may be admissible in hostile environment cases because it is relevant to the
issue of whether a term or condition of employment has been affected.
70 This straightforward interpretation of the elements of a Title VII cause of action also
help to explain the "romance" cases, cases in which discrimination claims grow out of an
office romance. The leading romance case involved a claim by men who did not get a
promotion because it was given to a woman who was romantically involved with the
supervisor. The court held that this was not illegal sex discrimination. See DeCintio v.
Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 825 (1986);
see also Thomson v. Olson, 866 F. Supp 1267 (D.N.D. 1994), aff'd, 56 F.3d 69 (8th Cir.
1995) (rejecting a claim that a supervisor's affair with another employee was sex
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using the mixed motives model in the same way it is used in other types of
discrimination cases. The "affects" element would be met directly in quid pro quo
cases through proof that a tangible aspect of employment was adversely affected. In
hostile environment cases, the element would be met through proof that the
discriminatory conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the working
environment. As a result, the discrimination-centered model would modify the
discrimination). But see King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding sex
discrimination when a male supervisor passed over a more qualified female in favor of a
woman with whom he was having an affair). The other major category of cases within this
class involves women who bring claims after they are denied benefits (such as a job or
promotion) because they end or refuse to begin a romantic relationship with the supervisor.
The courts generally hold that this is sex discrimination. See Dirksen v. City of Springfield,
842 F. Supp. 1117 (C.D. Ill. 1994); Babcock v. Frank, 729 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
Finally, for purposes of discussion, consider a hypothetical claim brought by a woman who
claims sex discrimination after she receives a promotion because of a consensual romantic
relationship. Intuition tells us that this should not be a cognizable case of sex discrimination.
(For obvious reasons, there has been no case like this, nor will there be.) Commentators
generally have found the first two categories of these cases inconsistent and then argued that
the DeCintio line of cases was wrongly decided. See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., TEACHER'S
MANUAL FOR CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 67 (4th ed. 1997)
(asserting that DeCintio is "clearly wrongly decided"); Mary C. Manemann, Comment, The
Meaning of "Sex" in Title VII: Is Favoring an Employee Lover a Violation of the Act?, 83
Nw. U. L. REv. 612, 662-63 (1989).
The analysis proposed in this section reconciles outcomes in the two (or three)
situations. The first issue is whether there is discrimination. Focusing on the plaintiffs, was
their sex a motivating factor for the decision? Would they have been treated differently if
they had been of the opposite sex? In the first situation, the male plaintiffs cannot establish
the discrimination element. If they had been of the opposite sex, they still would not have
been selected for the job. They would have been in the same position as the many other
women in the workplace who also were not selected. Their sex was not a motivating factor
for placing them in the category of people who were not selected. This point clarifies that the
focus should be on the sex of the plaintiff in the case: was his sex a motivating factor for the
decision? The focus should not be on the role sex played in the outcome for someone else.
On the other hand, the paramour herself in these examples can establish the discrimination
element. Assuming a heterosexual supervisor, she would not have been selected for the
relationship (in the second situation) or the promotion (in the third situation) had she been
a man. Her sex was a motivating factor for the decisions. The paramour can establish a case
of sex discrimination in the second situation because that discrimination is coupled with an
adverse effect on a term or condition of her employment. Thus, she can establish both the
discrimination and "affects" elements of a Title VII cause of action. On the other hand, the
paramour cannot establish a case of sex discrimination in the third situation because,
although there is discrimination, no term or condition of her employment has been adversely
affected. By assumption, no "tangible" aspect of employment has been affected and,
principally, because the conduct was not unwelcome, she cannot establish that the conduct
was sufficiently severe or pervasive to have adversely affected her work environment. Thus,
she cannot meet the "affects" element of a Title VII cause of action.
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standard model of sexual harassment in several ways. First, unwelcomeness would
not be an element of a harassment cause of action, although it might be relevant to
the "affects" element in hostile environment cases. Second, sexual conduct would
not be an element of the cause of action, but might be relevant to the discrimination
element. Third, the "based on sex" element would be strengthened by requiring it
in every circuit and rejecting both the heterosexual presumption and overly exacting
parsing of motivation. Finally, the standard model's "severe or pervasive" element
would be retained as an alternate way to satisfy the "affects" element in hostile
environment cases.
III. THE DISCRIMINATION-CENTERED MODEL AND THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court's sexual harassment decisions support a discrimination-
centered model. Read closely, the cases carefully distinguish between the two basic
elements of a Title VII claim and require proof of both. Equally significant, the cases
fail to support the implicit claim of the standard model that a claim of sexual
harassment should be treated as an exceptional type of discrimination claim.
The Supreme Court has decided only five sexual harassment cases under Title
VII, 7' but two of them are of limited use in analyzing the appropriate model of
discrimination because they focus on the issue of employer liability.72 Nevertheless,
despite the small number of cases, the Supreme Court has provided important
guidance.
In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,73 the Supreme Court's first harassment
decision, the Court began its discussion by citing section 703(a)(1) of Title VII. 74
The Supreme Court has begun each of its harassment decisions in this way.75 This
approach is significant for several reasons. First, it indicates that the Court is vitally
interested in tying harassment law to the statutory language and, hence, to the rest of
discrimination law. Second, it is this section of the statute that states clearly the two
basic elements of a Title VII cause of action: discrimination and an effect on a term
or condition of employment. These two elements define the essence of the
discrimination-centered model of harassment, but are largely avoided and obscured
7' The Court also has decided one sexual harassment case under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §
1681 (1994), but the holding of that case, like the two cases cited infra note 72, focused on
the issue of employer liability and, as a result, is not relevant to this discussion. See Gebser
v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).
72 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc.
v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
73 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
74 See id. at 63-64.
75 See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2282-83; Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2264; Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1001 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,
21 (1993); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63-64.
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by the standard model. Third, the citations indicate that the Court views harassment
as one type of disparate treatment discrimination. All disparate treatment cases are
based on this language. The Court pointedly does not rely on section 703(a)(2) of
Title VII, which is the statutory base for disparate impact discrimination.76
Meritor begins Supreme Court consideration of sexual harassment by noting and
distinguishing between the two basic elements of a Title VII claim. The
discrimination element, the Court said, is met "without question" when a supervisor
harasses a subordinate because of her sex.77 The Court did not specify exactly why
discrimination exists "without question" because the issue of whether discrimination
was present in the case was not a contested issue.7" Instead, the Court quickly turned
to the question presented by the case: is a "tangible loss" necessary to meet the
second element of a Title VII cause of action, effect on a term or condition of
employment?79 The Court held that it is not: "severe or pervasive" conduct is
sufficient to meet the second element even if no tangible aspect of employment has
been affected."0 As a result, Meritor supports the discrimination-centered model both
in the way the Court structured its decision and in the result.
Meritor is less clear on the role of unwelcomeness in harassment analysis. After
spending the bulk of its decision considering whether an effect on a tangible aspect
of employment was required to meet the second element of a Title VII cause of
action, the Court turned to the district court's finding that no Title VII violation had
occurred because the sexual relationship was "voluntary."'" The Court held that this
was error. Voluntariness "in the sense of consent"82 is not a defense to a Title VII
claim and so it was irrelevant. 3 At the same time, the Court said, the "gravamen of
76 See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 n.13 (1976); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 n.1 (1971). In 1991, Congress inserted into Title VII a more
specific articulation of the disparite impact model of discrimination. See Title VII
§ 703(k)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (1994). The Court has not cited this provision in later
sexual harassment cases either, again implying that sexual harassment is a variety of disparate
treatment discrimination, not disparate impact discrimination.
I recognize that the claim that section 703(a)(2) is the statutory base of disparate impact
discrimination is not an uncontroversial one, but it is unnecessary to examine this claim
closely here. See, e.g., SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 19, at § 4.2.1.2; Steven L. Willbom, The
Disparate Impact Model of Discrimination: Theory and Limits, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 799, 826-
28 (1985). The point here is a modest one: this is one small piece of evidence that the Court
views sexual harassment as one type of disparate treatment discrimination. If the piece is
challenged, or even taken away entirely, the overall argument is largely unaffected.
77 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.
78 See id. ("Petitioner apparently does not challenge this proposition.").
79 See id.
80 Id. at 64-68.
81 Id. at 68.
82 Id. at 69.
83 See id. at 68-69.
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any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were
'unwelcone."'"4
This language is unclear about the role of unwelcomeness in harassment law.
One interpretation could be that unwelcomeness is central in both quid pro quo and
hostile environment cases ("any sexual harassment claim") and, because it is the
"gravamen" of the claim, that analysis in all harassment cases is quite distinct from
analysis in other Title VII cases in which unwelcomeness is not an issue at all, much
less the central issue. An alternate interpretation of the language would be that the
Court was still talking, as it had been in the bulk of the decision, about the "affects"
element of a hostile environment case: unwelcomeness is central to that element
because, when no "tangible aspect" of employment has changed, the plaintiff's
reaction to the conduct is crucial in determining whether it was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the working environment. The first interpretation supports the
standard model of sexual harassment; the second interpretation supports the
discrimination-centered model. Although the language admittedly is unclear, the
second interpretation is better. Considering only Meritor, the first interpretation
follows the language strictly and divorces this one sentence from the rest of the
decision. The Supreme Court has cautioned against parsing language in court
decisions as if they were statutes, 85 and only by doing that can one conclude that the
language extends beyond the rest of the opinion, which focuses on the "affects"
element. Indeed, to the extent the language applies to quid pro quo cases, it clearly
is dicta. More significantly, however, the meaning of the language was clarified by
the next harassment case decided by the Supreme Court, Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc. 86
In Harris, the issue was whether serious damage to a plaintiff's psychological
well-being was necessary to establish a hostile environment case. The Court held
that it was not. 7 As in Meritor, the Court was clear that it was considering only the
"affects" element of a Title VII cause of action-no dispute existed about the
existence of discrimination.88 To meet the "affects" element, the Court held, the
plaintiff must establish that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create
a hostile or abusive environment both objectively to a reasonable person and
subjectively to the individual plaintiff.8 9 The Court's analysis supports the
84 Id. at 68.
" See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) ("[W]e think it generally
undesirable, where holdings of the Court are not at issue, to dissect the sentences of the
United States Reports as though they were the United States Code.").
86 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
87 See id. at 22.
8 See id. at 21-23.
89 See id. at 21-22.
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discrimination-centered model, as in Meritor, by identifying the two elements of a
Title VII cause of action and analyzing the case within that framework.
Harris also helps to resolve uncertainties about the Court's treatment of the
unwelcomeness concept in Meritor. In Harris, the Court never used the word
"unwelcome." This implies that unwelcomeness is not an element of every sexual
harassment case; if unwelcomeness were an element of every sexual harassment
cause of action, one would have expected the Court to at least mention the concept
in its discussion. Instead, the Court clearly cited only the two elements in the
discrimination-centered model: discrimination and an effect on a term or condition
of employment.' Nevertheless, the Court alluded to unwelcomeness when it held
that the victim subjectively must perceive the environment to be abusive to establish
a hostile environment case. Like unwelcomeness, this requirement focuses on the
reaction of the victim, rather than the actions of the perpetrator. The Court made it
clear, however, that this requirement applied only in hostile environment cases and
was relevant only to establish the "affect" element."
The Oncale decision itself provides the most support for the discrimination-
centered model. As in the earlier decisions, the Court focused on the two elements
apparent in Title VII's statutory language.92 This, by itself, provides soft support for
the discrimination-centered model. But, unlike the earlier decisions, Oncale focuses
on the discrimination element, rather than the "affects" element. The decision
strongly supports the discrimination-centered model, while severely undermining the
standard model.
On discrimination, Oncale began by relying on nonharassment cases to inform
the meaning of discrimination in harassment cases. In cases other than harassment
90 See id. at 21 ("When the workplace is permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult,' that is 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment and create an abusive working environment,' Title VII is violated."
(citations omitted)).
" The concurring opinions of Justices Scalia and Ginsburg also focused on the "affects"
element. Justice Scalia, however, made one statement which tends to support the standard
model of sexual harassment: "As a practical matter, today's holding lets virtually unguided
juries decide whether sex-related conduct engaged in (or permitted by) an employer is
egregious enough to warrant an award of damages." Id at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring). This
statement supports the standard model primarily because it does not mention discrimination
as an element of the cause of action, but instead requires only "sex-related conduct." For two
reasons, however, the language should not be overemphasized. First, it appeared in an
opinion that focused on the "affects" element. Justice Scalia was not attempting to define
precisely all the elements of a cause of action; instead, his statement was intended as an
expression of concern about the vagueness of the standard for meeting the "affects" element.
Second, in a later majority opinion, Justice Scalia made it clear that discrimination (not "sex-
related conduct") was central to a harassment cause of action. See Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002-03 (1998).
92 See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001-03.
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cases, the Court said, it had never found preclusive the fact that the alleged
discriminator was of the same sex or race as the purported victim. 3 As a result, the
Court held that that would not be a determinative factor in harassment cases either.94
For our purposes, this analysis has significance beyond the holding because it
indicates that, to the Court, discrimination is the same in harassment cases as it is in
other cases. This supports the discrimination-centered model, which adheres to that
position, but not the standard model, which analyzes discrimination in harassment
cases differently than in other cases.
The Court then went on to discuss affirmatively the meaning of discrimination
in harassment cases. In determining the appropriate model for analyzing sexual
harassment cases, this discussion is important in two respects. First, in three different
places, the Court flatly rejected the "sexual conduct" element of the standard model. 95
Indeed, the Court stated that the sexual content of the conduct was not the issue;
instead, the issue was whether the conduct, regardless of its sexual content,
constituted "discrimina[tion] . . . because of. . . sex."96 Second, the Court's
discussion of discrimination in harassment cases closely tracked the meaning of
discrimination in other cases, without actually delineating a single model of analysis.
The Court's discussion indicated a willingness to find discrimination using a type of
but-for test: would the conduct have occurred if the victim were of the opposite sex?97
But the Court also alluded to the mixed-motives model: was the conduct motivated
" See id at 1001. For this proposition, the Court cited Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983), and Castaneda i. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
94 See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
9' See id ("We have never held that workplace harassment . . . is automatically
discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or
connotations." "[H]arassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an
inference of discrimination on the basis of sex"; but "the plaintiff.., must always prove that
the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually
constituted 'discrimina[tion]... because of... sex."').
96 Id
97 The Court alluded to this test of discrimination in a couple of places. Quoting from
Justice Ginsburg's concurrence in Harris, the Court said: "'The critical issue, Title VII's text
indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions
of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed."' Id at 1002 (quoting
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg. J., concurring)). Expanding
on this concept, the Court said:
Courts and juries have found the inference of discrimination easy to draw
in most male-female sexual harassment situations, because the challenged
conduct typically involves explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity; it is
reasonable to assume those proposals would not have been made to someone of
the same sex.
Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
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by sex?98 The Court's discussion, then, tracked the treatment of discrimination
elsewhere when the Court accepted different ways of proving disparate treatment
discrimination, but insisted that discrimination, bywhatever method, be proven.
In Oncale, the Court also discussed the "affects" element of a harassment action.
The Court said that harassment cases would not expand Title VII into a "general
civility code" because the "affects" element requires that the conduct be severe or
pervasive.99 This requirement is "crucial," the Court said, because it ensures that
"courts and juries do not mistake ordinary socializing in the workplace-such as
male-on-male horseplay or intersexual flirtation-for discriminatory 'conditions of
employment."' ° This discussion is significant both for what it says and what it fails
to say. In the discussion, the Court clearly distinguished between the discrimination
element, which it discussed earlier in the opinion, and the "affects" element, which
it discussed here. Thus, the discussion is significant in what it says because it
emphasized once again that harassment cases involve the same two elements as other
discrimination cases, and not a different and unique set of elements. The discussion
also is significant because of what it fails to say. Once again, as in Harris, the Court
failed to mention unwelcomeness. The fall of unwelcomeness from the "gravamen"
of a harassment case in Meritor to nary a mention in Harris and Oncale supports,
once again, the central thesis of this Article: that harassment cases do not require a
unique and idiosyncratic set of elements, but rather are merely one category of
discrimination that can be fit into the general analytical framework of Title VII.
In sum, the Supreme Court harassment cases provide strong support for a
discrimination-centered model of sexual harassment, while undermining the standard
model. Read carefully, all of the Supreme Court decisions attend to the two basic
elements of a Title VII cause of action: discrimination and an effect on a term or
condition of employment. Only the earliest case, Meritor, seems to require a
distinctive element-unwelcomeness-and the force of that language in Meritor has
been undermined by inattention in later cases. The standard model finds little
support in the Supreme Court decisions. In Oncale particularly, the Court explicitly
rejected sexual conduct as a substitute for discrimination. Similarly, Oncale
implicitly rejected the heterosexual presumption of discrimination by emphasizing
the requirement that discrimination must be proven.
IV. THE DISCRIMINATION-CENTERED MODEL AND THE
ACADEMIC LITERATURE
In this section, I will discuss two aspects of the vast academic literature on sexual
harassment. First, I will discuss how the discrimination-centered model meshes with
98 See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
99 Id. at 1002-03.
'oo Id. at 1003.
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the predominant theories of sexual harassment in the workplace. The short answer
is: not very well. Viewing the academic theories of sexual harassment through the
lens of the discrimination-centered model, however, facilitates a critique of those
theories and helps to sharpen the meaning and scope of the discrimination-centered
model. In this section, I also will discuss the literature that challenges sexual
harassment law on First Amendment grounds. The discrimination-centered model
fully addresses these concerns.
A. Sexual Harassment Theory
Sexual harassment has fostered a large body of scholarly work about its
underlying theory. This section will consider three of the most important current
approaches to the issue: the subordination approach, the respect approach, and the
competence-centered approach.'' This section will critique these alternative
approaches through the lens of the discrimination-centered model. In addition,
because the discrimination-centered model of sexual harassment is different in
significant ways from each of these approaches, the discussion will help to bring the
discrimination-centered model into sharper focus.
1. The Subordination Approach
The subordination approach to sexual harassment is ubiquitous in the legal
literature on the subject. 2 Rather than attempt to survey all of it, this section will
focus on the important, recent version articulated by Professor Katherine M.
Franke. 03
101 For space and energy reasons, I have not considered other important approaches. See,
e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Rational Women: A Test for Sex-Based Harassment, 83 CAL. L.
REV. 1151 (1995); Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A
Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 333 (1990).
02 Professor MacKinnon's seminal book, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case
Study of Discrimination, published in 1979, has been cited in 599 articles. Westlaw search,
Journals & Law Reviews database (Nov. 30, 1998). Obviously, not all of these are supportive
of the anti-subordination approach, nor are they all about sexual harassment, but the large
number of citations does indicate that this general approach to discrimination is well-known
and often discussed.
"'3 Professor Franke's principal articles focusing on sexual harassment are: Katherine M.
Franke, Gender, Sex, Agency and Discrimination: A Reply to Professor Abrams, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1245 (1998) [hereinafter Franke, Gender]; and Katherine M. Franke,
What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691 (1997) [hereinafter Franke,
What's Wrong].
Important differences exist within the subordination approach. By emphasizing
Professor Franke's work, I do not mean to diminish the important contributions made by
many other scholars. Rather, my goal simply is to keep the discussion manageable and
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The subordination approach, in general terms, contends that a theory focusing
merely on differences in treatment is inadequate. Instead, sexual harassment is
viewed as a structural problem in which society upholds and reinforces inferiority.
In Professor MacKinnon's original version, the theory was conceptualized as men
subordinating women." Sexual harassment was one tool for enforcing that type of
subordination.' 5 Professor Franke's view is broader. 6 According to her, the
subordination problem includes men subordinating women, but that is only one
example of the broader problem: practices which maintain and enforce hetero-
patriarchical gender norms in the workplace. 7
A central part of Professor Franke's major work on sexual harassment is a
critique of the but-for approach to determining whether harassment is discrimination:
the harassment is discrimination if the harasser would not have engaged in the
conduct "but for" the victim's sex.'08 At base, the but-for test of discrimination is
problematic, according to Professor Franke, because it reduces the test of
discrimination to a determination of whether the harasser sexually desired the victim.
This equation of the but-for test with sexual desire produces an undue emphasis on
sexual orientation and focuses attention on the subjective state of the harasser, rather
than on the conduct as experienced by the victims. Professor Franke views these as
serious problems. 9
Professor Franke's critique of the but-for approach to discrimination is
problematic for two related reasons. First, she critiques the but-for test of
discrimination even though it is not the appropriate test for use in harassment cases.
focused.
104 See MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 4 (arguing that the antisubordination approach
"understands the sexes to be not simply socially differentiated but socially unequal. In this
broader view, all practices which subordinate women to men are prohibited.").
'05 See id at 191-92 ("Sexual harassment is a clear social manifestation of male privilege
incarnated in the male sex role that supports coercive sexuality reinforced by male power
over the job.").
.06 Although Professor Franke critiques Professor MacKinnon's particular version of
antisubordination, she nevertheless builds her vision of sexual harassment on an
antisubordination base: "I regard the anti-subordination view of sexual harassment as the
most principled account of the wrong of sexual harassment, [but it must be modified]."
Franke, What's Wrong, supra note 103, at 730. See Kathryn Abrams, Songs of Innocence and
Experience: Dominance Feminism in the University, 103 YALE L.J. 1533, 1549 n.66 (1994)
(reviewing KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS
(1993)); Franke, Gender, supra note 103, at 1250-54; Franke, What's Wrong, supra note
103, at 761-62.
107 See Franke, Gender, supra note 103, at 1246; Franke, What's Wrong, supra note 103,
at 772.
108 See Franke, What's Wrong, supra note 103, at 729-59.
109 See id.
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In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,"° the Supreme Court considered and explicitly
rejected the but-for test: "To construe the words 'because of [in Title VII] as
colloquial shorthand for 'but-for causation,' ... is to misunderstand them."''. The
Court opted instead for a "motivating factor" test, which later was incorporated into
Title VII: a plaintiff successfully proves discrimination when she proves that "her
gender played a motivating part in an employment decision."' " Professor Franke's
failure to analyze the correct test is especially troubling because in Price Waterhouse
the Court applied the motivating factor test in a factual context that, even though it
did not involve sexual harassment directly, was analogous. The case involved both
direct, blatant evidence of discrimination"' and sexual stereotyping," 4 both of which
often are present in harassment cases. In her lengthy critique of the but-for test," 5
Professor Franke never mentions Price Waterhouse's rejection of it as the appropriate
standard (she never mentions the case at all), nor does she discuss the test which
ought to be applied, the motivating factor test."6
Professor Franke's critique of the but-for test also is problematic because of its
equation of the but-for test with sexual desire. Professor Franke moves much too
quickly from asserting that sexual orientation under the but-for approach often "plays
a central role in determining whether the offending sexual conduct was 'because of
sex,"""'1 to the claim that, under the but-for approach, "a harasser only sexually
harasses members of the class of people that he or she sexually desires.""' Her
assertion is that because some cases using the but-for approach focus on sexual
orientation and sexual desire, therefore all sexual harassment cases depend on a
showing of sexual desire. She escalates a factor that sometimes is used as evidence
110 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
... Id. at 240.
2 Id. at 258. See also Title VII § 703(m), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994).
"13 Among other reasons, men evaluating the plaintiff for promotion in Price Waterhouse
objected to her "because it's a lady using foul language" and advised her to "walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled,
and wear jewelry." Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
114 See id. at 235-36,255-58.
.. Professor Franke's critique of the but-for test covered 18 pages. See Franke, What's
Wrong, supra note 103, at 729-47.
116 Professor Franke's avoidance of the motivating factor test of Price Waterhouse is
curious because, in another article, she lauds the case as an "inspiration." Katherine M.
Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex From
Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 95 (1995). Her position may be that the courts have not
followed the guidance of Price Waterhouse appropriately in sexual harassment cases, and I
would agree with that conclusion. But that position is quite a different type of argument than
the one Professor Franke makes when she ignores this important strand in the law, while
discussing another strand that has been explicitly rejected.
... Franke, What's Wrong, supra note 103, at 732.
118 Id.
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of discrimination ("we find discrimination because the perpetrator has sexual desire
only for women and, therefore, would not have engaged in this conduct had the
victim been a man") to a factor that defines the entire class of sexual harassment
cases ("sexual harassment cannot have occurred because the perpetrator did not
sexually desire the victim"). Setting up the problem in this way clearly is incorrect." 9
Many cases find sexual harassment in the absence of sexual desire; sexual
harassment also can occur because of misogyny, 2' to mark jobs as masculine,' 2' and
for a host of other reasons.' Moreover, it is quite ironic that Professor Franke would
incorrectly state the problem in this way because she then proceeds to critique the
but-for approach precisely because it is underinclusive. The but-for/sexual desire
approach is erroneous because it fails to capture all the sexual harassment which
should be prohibited.2 2 To be sure, Professor Franke is correct in making that
statement, but it is a telling point in her analysis only because she sets up the point
by overstating the importance of sexual desire in sexual harassment cases generally.
She very effectively blows over the straw figure she constructed for herself, but fails
to consider the very real person standing nearby.
In addition to her critique of the but-for test of discrimination, Professor Franke
also forwards an affirmative vision of the wrong of sexual harassment: "sexual
harassment is sex discrimination . . . because its use and effect police hetero-
partriarchal gender norms in the workplace.' 24 But when she applies this standard
to the three sets of cases around which she bases her critique of harassment law, she
finds that it does not do a very good job. First, she applies her standard to situations
in which a gay perpetrator harasses someone because of sexual desire. Her theory
does not work here, she recognizes, because "no larger cultural gender orthodoxy is
being policed, perpetuated or enforced."'25 Her solution is to fall back on the but-for
test of discrimination, understood by her as discrimination because of sexual desire,
which is the same test she criticized and found unacceptable earlier in the article.'
26
" See IRVING M. COPI, INTRODUCTION TO LoGic 172 (3d ed. 1968) ("The conclusion of
a valid argument can not go beyond or assert any more than is (implicitly) contained in the
premises.").
120 See, e.g., Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 905 (1st Cir. 1988);
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Morris
v. American Nat'l Can Corp., 730 F. Supp. 1489, 1496 (E.D. Mo. 1989).
.2 See, e.g., Smith v. St. Louis Univ., 109 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 1997). See also the many
cases cited by Professor Schultz in Schultz, supra note 20, at 1762-74.
122 See, e.g., Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996 (10th Cir. 1996) (discussing
a plaintiff who was harassed because of jealousy about her success).
123 See Franke, What's Wrong, supra note 103, at 734.
124 Id. at 772. See also Franke, Gender, supra note 103, at 1246 (discussing Professor
Kathryn Abrams's critique of Franke's vision of the wrong of sexual harassment as a gender-
based harm).
12' Franke, What's Wrong, supra note 103, at 767.
126 See id. She attempts to justify this inconsistency by arguing that the but-for test is
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In this circumstance, however, the victim should be able to use the but-for test and
prove discrimination based on the perpetrator's sexual desire. Second, she applies
her standard to same-sex harassment when the conduct is sexual in nature, but of the
"rough house" or "horsing around" variety. Once again, Professor Franke recognizes
that her theory does not apply very easily because it cannot be assumed, as it often
can be in the opposite-sex equivalent, that the harassment is enforcing "larger cultural
norms of women as sex objects and men as sex subjects."' 27 In this case, Professor
Franke argues that the victim must meet a higher standard of proof in demonstrating
that there actually was a gender orthodoxy in the workplace which the conduct was
serving to enforce. She recognizes that this higher burden means that some very
objectionable conduct at work will not fall within her conception of sexual
harassment, but calls for new laws (or more rigorous enforcement of old ones) to deal
with that class of cases.'28 Third, she applies her standard to situations in which
(usually) a gay man is targeted in the workplace because he fails to conform to.
hetero-masculine norms. Her theory applies in a very straightforward way to this
situation, instructing that it is clearly illegal, which it ought to be.' 29
Professor Franke's critique of the but-for approach to harassment and her
affirmative theory provide a useful lens through which to view a discrimination-
centered approach. First, her cramped view of the but-for test emphasizes the
strength and expansiveness of the motivating factor test which ought to be applied
in harassment cases. The correct inquiry is not whether the conduct was motivated
by sexual desire, nor is the burden on the plaintiff to isolate sexual desire from the
other possible motivating factors and prove that it, and not the others, was the true
motivating factor. Rather, the plaintiff need merely prove that sex was one of the
factors motivating the conduct. This approach to finding discrimination solves most
of the problems Professor Franke noted with the but-for approach. For example,
Professor Franke noted that the focus on sexual desire incorporated a hetero-sexist
point of view because sexual desire tended to be assumed in opposite-sex cases, but
needed to be proven in same-sex cases. 30 Properly applied, the motivating factor test
would not do that. That the sex of the victim motivated the perpetrator would need
to be proven in every case, including opposite-sex cases, and it could be proven in
a wide variety of ways, including but not limited to proof of sexual desire. In
inappropriate elsewhere because it is too narrow a standard: sexual harassment should
include instances of conduct because of sexual desire, but it should not be limited to those
circumstances. See id. at 767 n.398. Nevertheless, as in the situation of harassment by a gay
person because of sexual desire, the but-for test should be available as one avenue for
proving discrimination. This argument depends on Franke's overly constricted view of the
meaning of discrimination in the ordinary case.
..7 Id. at 769.
... See id. at 769-70.
129 See id. at 770-71.
130 See id. at 735-37.
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particular, the three cases Professor Franke cites as problematic (cases of gay men
being harassed) would be handled well by a motivating factor analysis: the harassers
were motivated in part by the sex of the victims because they would not have
harassed women in any of the situations.
Similarly, Professor Franke complains that the but-for test is problematic because
it focuses attention on the motivation of the harasser, rather than on the consequences
of harassment for the victims. 3' For example, Professor Franke says, male
supervisors may not know that a female subordinate may regard comments like "you
have a great figure" or "nice legs" as offensive."' The motivating factor analysis
eases this concern. Professor Franke assumes that, because the supervisor did not
know that the comments would be offensive, they could not meet the but-for test of
discrimination. But that is not the case with the motivating factor analysis, properly
applied. The question to ask is: would the supervisor have made these comments to
a male subordinate? If not, and it seems highly unlikely, the motivating factor test
is satisfied-discrimination has been proven.' This example emphasizes that the
motivating factor test, properly applied, is a very generous test for proving
discrimination. The issue is not why the supervisor made the statements (for
example, was it because of sexual desire?), but rather whether the conduct was
motivated at least in part by the sex of the recipient. Professor Franke's concern that
the test focuses attention on the motivation of the harasser, rather than the
consequences on victims, is still present, of course. But that concern is ameliorated
when one considers the entire discrimination-centered model, instead of only the
discrimination element. The discrimination element, it is true, focuses on the
motivation of the harasser. The "affects" element, on the other hand, focuses on the
victim; it asks very directly whether the conduct affected a term or condition of the
victim's employment. The discrimination-centered model pays attention to both the
motivation of the harasser (through the discrimination element) and the effect of the
conduct on the victim (through the "affects" element).
Professor Franke's analysis also provides a useful lens through which to view the
discrimination-centered model because it emphasizes the broad range of conduct
which would be captured by the model-a much broader range than Professor
Franke's own model. Consider the three same-sex situations to which she applies her
model. The first situation of same-sex harassment based on sexual desire, which is
not harassment under her model, most likely would be under a discrimination-
'3' See id. at 745-46.
132 See id.
"3 This is not to say that a successful case of sexual harassment has been established. In
addition to proving discrimination, the plaintiff would have to prove that the conduct affected
a term or condition of employment. These kinds of statements, without more, most likely
would not be sufficiently severe or pervasive to meet the second basic element of a hostile
environment case.
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centered model. Certainly, the discrimination element would be satisfied because a
gay harasser would not engage in the same objectionable conduct toward someone
of the opposite sex.134 Similarly, Professor Franke's second situation (same-sex, but
sexually-oriented rough-housing and horsing around) is quite problematic under her
analysis, but easy under a discrimination-centered model. If, to use Professor
Franke's examples, the perpetrators are teasing men with plastic penises and using
language like "suck my dick,"'35 but would not do so with women, 36 the
discrimination element is satisfied under a discrimination-centered model. Finally,
Professor Franke's third situation (targeting a man because he is not sufficiently
masculine) would be discrimination even more easily under a motivating factor
analysis than under Professor Franke's analysis. Instead of having to prove that there
are hetero-patriarchal norms in this workplace and that this conduct was undertaken
to enforce them, one simply need prove that women in the workplace are not targeted
for being insufficiently masculine. In sum, the discrimination-centered model
prohibits a broader range of objectionable conduct than Professor Franke's suggested
analysis, and does so in a way that is in line with discrimination law as applied
outside of harassment law, that is more intuitively identifiable as discrimination, and
that is more accessible to the courts and juries who will be applying it." 7
13' Although this example clearly would meet the discrimination element in the
discrimination-centered model, it is not clearly sexual harassment under the model because
it also must meet the "affects" requirement. It is possible that the conduct in this example
would neither affect a tangible aspect of employment nor be sufficiently severe or pervasive
-to alter the working environment. Elsewhere in her article, Professor Franke appears to
accept limiting prohibited conduct to that which rises to a particular level of offensiveness.
See Franke, What's Wrong, supra note 103, at 770.
".. See id. at 768.
136 It is important to note that no women need be present in the workplace to make this
showing. The relevant question to ask is: would the conduct. have occurred if the victim were
a woman? See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989). In a sense, this
question always is hypothetical because the actual victim is never, at the same time, both his
own sex and the opposite sex. Thus, that the question is hypothetical in the case in which no
person of the opposite sex is in the workplace does not make the case any different,
theoretically, from any other case. Proving the discrimination may be more difficult because
one cannot point to persons of the opposite sex who have been treated differently, but even
that evidence only goes to prove the central underlying issue which necessarily is
hypothetical: would the conduct have been different if this particular person was of the
opposite sex? Thus, those who criticize the motivating factor analysis because it does not
apply to one-sex workplaces are off base.
' Viewed in this way, Professor Franke's primary method of analysis is ironic. Her
general mode of analysis is to examine cases at the margin to determine what light they shed
on cases at the center. See Franke, supra note 116, at 7; Franke, What's Wrong, supra note
103, at 759. The irony is that that mode of analysis tends to cut against the antisubordination
approach to harassment. The antisubordination approach applies quite well at the center.
Most of the cases do involve heavily gendered workplaces in which men act to maintain and
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The discrimination-centered model also is broader than Professor Franke's in
another way. The discrimination-centered model relies on a generic conception of
discrimination which has been applied across the full range of types of
discrimination, such as race, age, and disability discrimination. Professor Franke's
model, in contrast, applies to these other types of discrimination, if at all, only
uncertainly and in quite modified versions.' The concept of discrimination as the
maintenance and enforcement ofhetero-patriarchical gender norms in the workplace
simply does not apply to harassment because of one's race, age, or disability.
Professor Franke may be able to make analogous arguments with respect to these
other types of harassment, but she has not done so yet and, even if she did, the
analysis necessarily would differ in significant respects from her analysis of sexual
harassment. The discrimination-centered model provides one conceptualization of
the legal violation which is both broad enough to encompass all types of harassment
and which is firmly tethered to the body of antidiscrimination law. Sexual
harassment law is not exceptional, but rather it is merely one type of prohibited
discrimination.
Finally, Professor Franke's approach tends to highlight the extent to which the
discrimination-centered approach is tied to Title VII, the statutory base of sexual
harassment law. In contrast to the many connections between both the language of
Title VII and the language of the Supreme Court cases discussing sexual
harassment,'39 Professor Franke's approach has only a very tenuous connection with
either. Nothing in Title VII says anything about "hetero-patriarchal gender norms,"
nor is there any direct supportive language in the Supreme Court cases. 4 This,
obviously, does not mean that the dominance-based theories are wrong. It is
common, after all, for academics to provide better explanations and deeper theories
for decisions than the courts have been able to do on their own. 14' That, indeed, is
enforce that culture. But, as Professor Franke acknowledges, the approach applies only very
uneasily to cases at the margin, such as the first two situations discussed in the text.
138 The plural is used here advisedly. Professor Franke's rationale is likely to require
separate theories for each of these other types of harassment.
9 See supra text accompanying notes 7 1-100.
40 In contrast to Supreme Court jurisprudence in which there is very little support for
antisubordination theory, occasional support can be found in some lower court opinions. See
Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 861 n.15 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[H]ostile
environment cases depend on the underlying theory that '[w]omen's sexuality largely defines
women as women in this society, so violations of it are abuses of women as women.'
(quoting MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 174)). But see Gillian K. Hadfield, Sexual
Harassment, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 455-57
(Peter Newman ed., 1998) (arguing that the Supreme Court treats harassment as personal
tort-like abuse, rather than as systemic, society-wide harm as contemplated by
antisubordination theory).
141 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980) (articulating a process theory of judicial review); Guido Calabresi & A.
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one of the functions of academics. Having said that, however, the extent to which
an approach aligns with statutory language and case law is generally viewed as quite
important, especially by legislatures and courts (if not always academics). And this
alignment is a factor cutting in favor of the discrimination-centered approach and
against Professor Franke's approach.
2. The Respect Approach
Professor Anita Bernstein articulates another approach to sexual harassment. In
an influential article, she argues that the current approach which emphasizes
reasonableness should be replaced with an approach based on respect.'42 The
primary question to be asked in harassment cases is: "Did [the employer] behave as
a respectful person toward [the plaintiff]?"'43 As others have noted, Professor
Bernstein supports her thesis impressively:
She seeks not only to resolve a protracted contrcversy about the proper
standpoint from which to assess sexual harassment but also to
reconceptualize the wrong and to address a range of ancillary problems
in the doctrine. She seeks to situate sexual harassment on a continuum
between employment discrimination and intentional tort and to use a rich
backdrop of philosophical literature to inform some practical legal
questions. Her account offers many features that enrich the existing
literature on sexual harassment: a meticulous and nuanced history of the
complications entailed by the reasonableness standard; an attentive,
sympathetic account of some subjective injuries imposed by harassing
conduct; a provocative argument for enhanced employer liability; and a
commonsense, comprehensible instruction for juries about what to look
for in a sexual harassment case.'
Professor Bernstein underplays the relationship between her theory and Title VII.
At first glance, the two appear to be completely unconnected. Title VII says nothing
directly about respect, nor does the concept of respect as articulated by Professor
Bernstein say anything directly about discrimination. In a single paragraph, however,
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (articulating a common framework for analyzing
property and tort issues); Howard Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62
COLUM. L. REV. 1363 (1962) (articulating a theory of secondary boycotts).
"42 See Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV.
446 (1997).
141 Id. at 522.
144 Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
1169, 1175 (1998) (citations omitted).
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Professor Bernstein explains how the concept of respect fits into a Title VII cause of
action:
[E]ven when the defendant did not behave as a respectful person, a Title
VII claim might fail under the respectful person standard because of its
poor fit with the antidiscrimination purposes of the statute. Disrespectful
conduct not based on sex would remain outside the remedial boundaries
of Title VII, consistent with the view now prevailing in the courts. When
disrespectful conduct is too trivial, isolated, or ambiguous to be deemed
"pervasive," summary judgment would be proper under the respectful
person standard.'45
Although helpful, this language is not clear about two possible fits between the
respectful person standard and Title VII. First, Professor Bernstein may mean that
the respectful person standard is separate and independent from the other Title VII
requirements. To establish a Title VII claim one must prove that the employer did
not act as a respectful person, and that the employer discriminated, and that the
conduct was pervasive. The jury instructions suggested by Professor Bernstein
support this interpretation, although they place the respectful person standard at the
center and the others at the periphery. 46 Alternatively, the respectful person standard
may be the viewpoint from which one decides whether the employer's conduct was
"pervasive."' 47 Under this view, the respectful person standard merely would be a
replacement for the reasonable person/woman standard, which long has been
145 Bernstein, supra note 142, at 505 (citations omitted).
146 The jury instructions proposed by Professor Bernstein begin with one paragraph which
provides a standard statement of the elements of a cause of action for hostile environment
sexual harassment, including discrimination and severe or pervasive conduct. The remaining
six paragraphs, however, focus on what it means to behave as a respectful person. See
Bernstein, supra note 142, at 521-24.
14' Following Professor Bernstein's lead, I am using "pervasive" here as shorthand to refer
to the requirement that the conduct be "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions
of [the plaintiff's] employment and create an abusive working environment." Bernstein,
supra note 142, at 505, 522.
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controversial.'48 A later article by Professor Bernstein supports this interpretation,
although it also is less than transparent.'49
Once again, Professor Bernstein's approach is a useful lens through which to
view the discrimination-centered model. Under the first interpretation, Professor
Bernstein's approach to sexual harassment is necessarily narrower than the
discrimination-centered approach. The discrimination-centered approach requires
only that the employer discriminate and, in a hostile environment case, that the
conduct be pervasive. Professor Bernstein's approach requires proof of an additional
element: lack of respect. The relevant class of cases, then, would be those in which
the employer discriminated through pervasive conduct, but nevertheless acted as a
respectful person. The discrimination-centered model would call for liability in this
class of cases; Professor Bernstein's approach would not. What kind of conduct
might fall into this class? Employers who regularly protected women from hard or
physical work would be one example; 5 ' the stereotype would be the old-fashioned
southern gentlemen as employer.'' Professor Bernstein responds to this, in her
... Compare Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1082 (1995) (applying the reasonable woman standard), with DeAngelis
v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 974
(1995) (applying the reasonable person standard). See generally Naomi R. Cahn, The
Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and Practice,
77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398 (1992) (discussing use of the "reasonable woman" standard in
sexual harassment law, battered woman self-defense law, and rape law); Nancy S.
Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual
Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177 (1990) (offering an "explanation for how the reasonable
person test retains its legitimacy in the face of numerous analytical weaknesses." Id at 1177-
78); Robert Unikel, Comment, "Reasonable" Doubts: A Critique of the Reasonable Woman
Standard in American Jurisprudence, 87 Nw. U. L. R/v. 326 (1992) (arguing that a
"modified" reasonable person standard is more appropriate than the reasonable woman
standard because the latter is impracticable in light of male judges' and jurors' inability to
discern the qualities of a reasonable woman without resorting to gender stereotypes).
149 In a later article, Professor Bernstein says that her Harvard article is a "narrow work"
which merely "proposes to replace the 'reasonable person' (and reasonable woman, man,
target, victim, and so forth) of hostile environment sexual harassment doctrine with the
'respectful person."' Anita Bernstein, An Old Jurisprudence: Respect in Retrospect, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1231, 1232 (1998) (citation omitted). On the same page, however,
Professor Bernstein also says that her article asks much broader questions: "What is [hostile
environment] sexual harassment? ... What does it mean to say-for purposes of dispute
resolution and the implicit function of private law as a source of communication between
citizens and the state about justice-that a defendant ought to face liability for hostile
environment sexual harassment?" Id.
50 Cf SULLIVAN ETAL., supra note 19, § 8.8 (discussing the effect of Title VII on state
laws intended to protect female workers).
151 Professor Abrams has made this point much better than I by pointing out that the
concept of respect can be heavily gendered. See Abrams, supra note 144, at 1179-84.
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typically straightforward and pithy manner, by claiming that "the pseudo-respectful
Confederate soldier and the pedestals he erects in the path of progress" are likely to
be very small in number and quite unsympathetic to juries.' I do not know if she
is correct on those two empirical points but, even assuming that she is, the argument
does not undermine the basic point of this comparison with the discrimination-
centered model: Professor Bernstein's approach necessarily is narrower because it
adds an extra element to the cause of action.
The second interpretation of Professor Bernstein's respect approach is that it
merely indicates the perspective from which one should analyze the pervasiveness
requirement: one should analyze it from the perspective of a respectful person, rather
than that of a reasonable person. Viewed in this way, Professor Bernstein highlights
one of several issues that the discrimination-centered approach put forward in this
Article does not address. The discrimination-centered approach requires that the
conduct be pervasive, but does not address the more attenuated issue of perspective.
That is an important issue, as is the issue of employer liability for harassing conduct.
But both are outside the scope of this Article, which focuses instead on identifying
the basic elements required to establish the existence of sexual harassment under
Title VII.
Finally, Professor Bernstein's approach emphasizes once again how closely
tethered the discrimination-centered approach is to the statute and cases. In contrast
to Professor Franke's approach, which merely did not find much support in Title VII
and the cases," 3 Professor Bernstein's approach flirts with direct conflict. Professor
Bernstein accepts "incivility" as an alternative articulation of "respect,"'54 which
approaches direct conflict with the Supreme Court's reluctance to create a "general
civility code for the American workplace.""' Similarly, when respect is viewed as
an alternative to reasonableness, Professor Bernstein's view contrasts sharply with
the Court's endorsement, albeit in dicta, of the "reasonable person" standard." 6 By
contrast, as discussed earlier, the discrimination-centered model is tethered closely
to both the statute and the case law and, as a result, treats harassment as an
unexceptional type of discrimination.'57
52 Bernstein, supra note 142, at 1237.
153 See supra text accompanying notes 103-41.
1'4 Bernstein, supra note 142, at 450.
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998).
156 See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003 (1998) (emphasizing that the severity of harassment
"should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position");
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (holding that a "reasonable person" must
find the environment to be hostile or abusive).
"" See supra text accompanying notes 44-100.
1999]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
3. The Competence-Centered Approach
Professor Vicki Schultz has forwarded another approach to sexual harassment
which emphasizes that it often functions to "denigrat[e] women's competence for the
purpose of keeping them away from male-dominated jobs or incorporating them as
inferior, less capable workers." 5 ' In pursuing this insight, she argues that hostile
environment cases should not be treated as distinct from other kinds of discrimination
cases and should not have special elements; that the courts should de-emphasize the
sexual content of harassing conduct and focus instead merely on whether the conduct
was based on gender; that the concept of unwelcomeness should be abandoned; and
that a presumption of illegal harassment should exist when the harassment is directed
at women who work in traditionally segregated job categories.'
Professor Schultz's approach is consistent with a discrimination-centered
approach in important respects. Both approaches, for example, argue that harassment
cases should not be treated as significantly different from other discrimination cases;
that the courts have erred by focusing on the sexual content of harassing conduct; and
that unwelcomeness should be de-emphasized. 6 ° This overlap is especially
interesting because the positions were reached through quite different methodologies.
Professor Schultz reached her positions based on an ambitious and impressive,
policy-oriented analysis of case law and theory. The analysis here supporting the
discrimination-centered model is much more modest and doctrinal, based primarily
on a close reading of the statutory language of Title VII and Supreme Court case law.
Nevertheless, even though the analyses begin at quite different locations and take
different routes to their conclusions, they converge on these important points.
Professor Schultz's approach to causation is similar to the discrimination-
centered approach in some respects, but distinct from it in others. Professor Schultz,
158 Schultz, supra note 20, at 1755.
See id. at 1797-802.
60 Professor Schultz would reject unwelcomeness entirely. See Shultz, supra note 20, at
1802. In contrast, the discrimination-centered model would reduce it from an element of
every cause of action to a factor that is relevant in hostile environment cases only. See supra
notes 63-69 and accompanying text. Professor Schultz's approach to unwelcomeness
highlights the extent to which she envisions a unitary theory of sexual harassment. See infra
notes 170-71 and accompanying text. If the law prohibits only harassment undermining work
competence, then rejecting welcomeness entirely makes perfect sense. As Professor Schultz
puts it, "few employees invite conduct that attacks their work performance in the name of
gender conformity." Schultz, supra note 20, at 1802. On the other hand, unwelcomeness may
retain a role to the extent harassment arises out of other types of discrimination, such as sheer
animosity to women, horseplay, or misguided romance. One can try to squeeze all of these
types of harassment into the work competence category and, hence, contend that
unwelcomeness is not relevant to any of them. Or one can, as the discrimination-centered
model does, recognize that unwelcomeness may be relevant to the "affects" issue in some
contexts.
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like proponents of the discrimination-centered approach, views motivating factor
analysis as the "touchstone" to causation. 6' And both envision a wide-ranging
inquiry into factors relevant to the issue of whether discrimination played a
motivating role in producing the objectionable conduct.'62 The analyses diverge,
however, on the significance of job segregation. Professor Schultz argues that a
presumption that conduct is gender based should be applied when the conduct is
directed at women who work in traditionally segregated job categories.163 The
discrimination-centered model does not incorporate such a presumption.
Professor Schultz's position on this presumption is ironic. A major part of
Professor Schultz's criticism of the current state of harassment law focuses on the
two-tiered structure of causation in which conduct with sexual content is treated as
presumptively discriminatory, but not conduct without sexual content. Her principal
concern with this dichotomy is that it tends to make "nonsexual forms of harassment
fade from view."'" But then she creates another presumption, this time for
segregated job categories, yet fails to appreciate how it may have the same effect.
Her presumption would tend to diminish the importance of harassing conduct that
occurs in nonsegregated job categories.
The discrimination-centered model, however, does not recognize the presumption
for other reasons. First, the presumption is not based either in Title VII or the
Supreme Court's harassment cases. Neither mentions or provides any support for
such a presumption. Second, the Court in discrimination cases has been wary of
special presumptions or other rules that tend to treat discrimination cases differently
than other civil cases.'65 Third, the presumption is much broader than the evidence
upon which it is based. Professor Schultz bases the presumption on the "proven link
between hostile work environment harassment and job segregation by sex."'66 The
only evidence she cites, however, is that women in male-dominated settings are more
61 See Schultz, supra note 20, at 1800.
162 See id. at 1800-01.
163 Professor Schultz says the presumption should apply when directed at women who
work in sex-segregated job categories. See id. at 1801. This implies that the presumption
would not be available if the claim were brought by a male working in a sex-segregated job,
and that implication is supported by Professor Schultz's underlying theory that harassment
is a mechanism used to denigrate the work competence of women. Professor Schultz,
however, uses an example which implies that the presumption should apply when males in
a female-dominated job category are held to preconceived notions of masculine behavior. See
id. at 1800 n.580.
' Id. at 1801.
165 See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993) (holding that
presumptions in Title VII cases operate like presumptions in all other cases); Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252-55 (1989) (noting that the "[c]onventional rules
of civil litigation generally apply in Title VII cases," while holding that burden of persuasion
rules in Title VII cases operate the same as in other cases).
66 Schultz, supra note 20, at 1801.
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likely to suffer harassment.67 The presumption she forwards is not limited to that
"proven link," but instead is much broader, applying also to women in female-
dominated job categories and, maybe, to men in either male- or female-dominated job
categories. 6 ' Fourth, Professor Schultz is very unclear about the conduct to which
the presumption would apply. She says clearly that the presumption is to apply to
"nonsexual conduct,"'69 so the sexual content of the conduct cannot trigger the
presumption. Does that mean that all conduct in segregated workplaces, even the
most innocuous, is presumptively discriminatory? If not, and excluding sexual
content as a possibility, what distinguishes the conduct giving rise to the presumption
from other conduct which would not? Professor Schultz provides no guidance to
these crucial questions and, even if answers are found, they imply that application of
the presumption would be quite difficult in practice. Finally, and most importantly,
the presumption increases the risk that one unitary theory of sexual harassment,
focusing on sexualized behavior, will be replaced with another, focusing on sex
segregation. 7° A principal value of the discrimination-centered model is that it is
very broad, flexible and generous in finding discrimination, based on the motivating
factor analysis. Creating a presumption for one type of evidence of discrimination
inevitably will tend to diminish the strength and importance of other avenues of
proof.
Rejection of Professor Shultz's presumption, however, does not imply that
evidence ofjob segregation is irrelevant. Evidence does exist, after all, that women
working in male-dominated jobs are at higher risk of harassment, so the existence of
job segregation in that circumstance may well be relevant to causation. Similarly, as
in Oncale, evidence that the workplace is all male may contribute to the plaintiff's
showing that he was treated differently because of his sex-the claim could be that
this type of conduct would not have occurred if women were present to de-
masculinize the workplace. But recognizing that job segregation may be relevant to
the causation issue is quite different from apresumption that discrimination is present
everywhere there is job segregation.
Professor Schultz also suggests a shift in perspective on what she calls the
"harm" issue and what this Article calls the "affects" element. Instead of focusing
on whether the conduct was severe or pervasive, Professor Schultz suggests that the
focus be directly on whether the conduct "makes it more difficult for the harassees
to do the job because of their gender."'' This approach has the advantage of shifting
attention away from the sexual content of the conduct to the effect of the conduct on
167 See id. at 1759.
161 See supra note 163.
169 Schultz, supra note 20, at 1801.
70 For this point made in a different way, see Abrams, supra note 144, at 1215. See also
supra note 160 (discussing Professor Schultz's view on this issue).
7' Schultz, supra note 20, at 1802.
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job performance.'72 In addition, it has the advantage of being tied even more directly
to the statutory language of Title VII than the severe or pervasive standard.'73 Yet,
it imposes a lesser standard than in quid pro quo cases, permitting the element to be
satisfied whenever the conduct affects job performance, and so maintains the
distinction between the two basic types of harassment claims. Nothing in the
discrimination-centered model would prohibit movement to this interpretation of the
"affects'? element. The model as articulated here does not adopt the interpretation
primarily because the severe or pervasive articulation of the standard is ensconced
firmly in the case law, including the cases in the Supreme Court.'74 In addition,
unlike the severe or pervasive articulation, this interpretation may have the
unfortunate side effect of requiring victims to prove that their job performance was
not stellar to make out a harassment case.
75
In sum, Professor Schultz's competence-centered account is consistent with the
discrimination-centered model in many respects. Most basically, both call for a
streamlined cause of action which emphasizes that harassment is quite similar to
other kinds of discrimination claims. The major difference between the two models
is the emphasis Professor Schultz places on job segregation.
B. Harassment and the First Amendment
Several scholars have attacked the standard model of sexual harassment on First
Amendment grounds. 76 Because the standard model largely eliminates
172 Seeid.
171 The relevant statutory language is that the discrimination must affect "compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment .... ." Title VII, § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
171 See supra text accompanying notes 71-100. See also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510
U.S. 17, 24-25 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting interference with an employee's
work performance as a replacement for the "severe or pervasive" standard).
17' This disadvantage must be balanced against the benefit mentioned by Professor
Schultz: the interpretation would make employers more hesitant to claim that harassees are
not competent workers because such a claim would make it easier for plaintiffs to meet the
"affects" element. See Schultz, supra note 20, at 1802.
176 See Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment
and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481 (1991); Jules B. Gerard, The First
Amendment in a Hostile Environment: A Primer on Free Speech and Sexual Harassment,
68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1003 (1993). See also Larry Alexander, Banning Hate Speech and
the Sticks and Stones Defense, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 71 (1996) (arguing that restrictions
on hate speech more generally are inconsistent with the First Amendment). Other scholars
have recognized tension between parts of harassment law and the First Amendment, but have
been. more willing to accommodate. See KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS:
INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LIBERTIES OF SPEECH (1995); Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom
of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEXAS
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discrimination as an element,' these scholars argue that the model renders
impermissible any type of unwelcome sexually-oriented speech that is "severe or
pervasive."' This is a strong argument. The model potentially prohibits a wide-
range of speech and other expressive conduct that normally would be protected and
that fails to fit within any of the well-recognized exceptions to First Amendment
protection (such as fighting words and obscenity). 79
For two different reasons, a discrimination-centered model of sexual harassment
would avoid this type of First Amendment problem. First, within the discrimination-
centered model, speech is not implicated directly. Instead, any speech merely is
evidence of one of the two elements of a Title VII cause of action: discrimination or
effect on a term or condition of employment. To illustrate, consider a situation in
which an employer discharges an employee and the only evidence of discrimination
is the employer's statement, "I discharged her because she's a woman." Although
the First Amendment would prohibit a direct penalty for making the statement, use
of the statement as evidence of illegal discrimination would clearly be permissible.
As the Supreme Court said in Wisconsin v. Mitchell,8 ' "[t]he First Amendment...
does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime
or to prove motive or intent.""'i' In exactly the same way, a discrimination-centered
model of sexual harassment makes clear that speech is not being regulated directly,
but rather is merely evidence of the elements of a harassment cause of action:
discrimination and an effect on a term or condition of employment. Under a
L. REv. 687 (1997); Nadine Strossen, The Tensions Between Regulating Workplace
Harassment and the First Amendment: No Trump, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 701 (1995); Eugene
Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 RuTGERS L. REV. 563 (1995). Still
other scholars defend harassment law as entirely consistent with the First Amendment. See
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); Mary Becker, How Free Is Speech at
Work?: 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 815 (1996); Deborah Epstein, Can a "Dumb Ass Woman"
Achieve Equality in the Workplace? Running theGauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing
Speech, 84 GEO* L.J. 399 (1996).
177 See supra text accompanying notes 18-43.
78 See Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work Environment" Harassment
Restrict?, 85 GEO. L.J. 627, 628-35 (1997). See also Browne, supra note 176, at 491-501
(discussing the First Amendment implications of certain Title VII sexual and racial
harassment claims); Gerard, supra note 176, at 1004-07 (arguing that free-speech problems
in hostile environment cases stem not from the statutory language of Title VII, but from the
EEOC's guidelines which have largely been treated as authoritative by the Supreme Court).
1' Professor Volokh has been particularly active in identifying situations in which
harassment claims have been based on speech. See Volokh, supra note 176; Eugene Volokh,
Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791 (1992);
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech vs. Workplace Harassment Law-A Growing Conflict
(visited Dec. 1, 1998) <http://www.law.ucla.edu/faculty/volokh/harass>.
180 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
81 Id. at 489.
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discrimination-centered model, speech is merely evidence of illegal discrimination
and, as such, falls within Mitchell's protective umbrella.
Second, a discrimination-centered model would avoid the First Amendment
problem because many of the speech restrictions cited with concern by scholars
would not violate Title VII. If speech does not provide evidence of one of the two
elements of a Title VII cause of action, it is completely unaffected. Thus, "Men
Working" signs"2 or a picture of Goya's "Naked Maja" painting, 3 to cite two real-
life examples, would be completely unaffected by Title VII unless they were
"discrimination" that "affected" a term or condition of employment. Similarly, a
discrimination-centered model of sexual harassment would not restrict a workplace
that contained lots of pinups of near-naked women and nothing else objectionable,'
unless the pinups provided evidence of discrimination that affected a term or
condition of employment-and it is unlikely that these examples would constitute
evidence of discrimination. If the picture, sign, or pinups were posted for everyone
to see, there simply would be no cognizable discrimination. 5 On the other hand, if
the pinups only began to appear when women entered the workplace, or if the Goya
painting was directed particularly at women because of its placement, or if the "Men
Working" sign was accompanied by taunting directed at women that implied that
they did not work hard (or hard enough), the speech may be evidence of
discrimination. But then, once again, it would fit within the Mitchell exception: the
First Amendment is not violated when speech is used as evidence of illegal
motivation.8 6
182 See Volokh, supra note 176, at 631-32.
'83 See id at 642.
14 Because almost all sexual harassment cases involve some touching or even outright
sexual assault, the First Amendment critics have been able to point to only one case fitting
this example, Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
See Estlund, supra note 176, at 691 n. 13. Professor Browne claims that the case imposes
liability "based entirely on the pervasive presence of sexually oriented magazines, pin-up
pictures... and 'sexually demeaning remarks and jokes' by male coworkers; the plaintiff
complained of neither physical assaults nor sexual propositions." Browne, supra note 176,
at 495. This description of the case, however, is true only if read very literally. While it is
true that the plaintiff did not complain of physical assaults or sexual propositions, it is not
true that the case imposes liability based entirely on highly objectionable speech. The case
also was based on testimony by other women in the workplace of sexual propositions and
assaults. See Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1499-50 1.
s By cognizable discrimination, I mean discrimination which would meet Price
Waterhouse's mixed-motives model, as described earlier. See supra text accompanying notes
46-56. As noted earlier, the disparate impact model generally is unavailable to prove
discrimination in these circumstances. See supra note 45.
186 Note that this is not Professor Volokh's accommodation between sexual harassment
law and the First Amendment. Professor Volokh argues that personally-directed harassing
speech may be restricted. See Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, supra
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A workplace containing a large number of pinups is likely to be quite offensive
to the women working there. Without additional evidence of discrimination,
however, the discrimination-centered model does not make that type of conduct
illegal. This result would be a major concern if cases existed in which the only
conduct at issue was pinups and there was no additional evidence of discrimination.
I know of no such cases. Certainly, the most well-known case involving pinups,
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, involved a large amount of other conduct that
easily met the discrimination element, and the existence of pinups simply was
additional evidence of that discrimination." 7 In this sense, however, the
discrimination-centered model is narrower than the theories discussed in the
preceding section. Subordination approaches and the respect approach would almost
certainly prohibit the pinups and the competence-centered approach would be likely
to do so. Given the absence of a situation in which this actually would make a
difference, however, this hypothetical narrowness is outweighed by the interest in
ensuring that sexual harassment law does not conflict with the First Amendment, the
ability of the discrimination-centered model to undercut First Amendment attacks
which threaten to limit sexual harassment law more broadly, and the actual situations,
mentioned in the preceding section, in which the discrimination-centered approach
is broader than the alternatives.
A discrimination-centered model of harassment, then, avoids the First
Amendment issue which otherwise threatens to weaken harassment law. The model
clarifies that the central issue is discrimination and, hence, shifts attention away from
the First Amendment and toward the issue to which Title VII is directed. Once the
force of the First Amendment issue is softened, the model should strengthen
harassment law by making courts more willing to rely on obnoxious speech to find
a violation of Title VII. That is, once the fear of infringing the First Amendment is
removed from these cases, courts may be more willing to rely on obnoxious
note 179, at 1843-71. For a similar, but more expansive proposal, see Estlund, supra note
176, at 741-59. Under the theory advanced in this Article, speech may be restricted
regardless of whether it is personally-directed or whether it is directed at women generally.
The crucial issue is not whether it is personally directed, but whether it is discriminatory.
Clearly, obnoxious speech that is directed only at a woman because she is a woman would
be discriminatory and, hence, could be restricted. But obnoxious speech directed at a large
number of female employees because they are women also would be discriminatory and
subject to restriction. For example, if the pinups were posted only when the company began
to hire women and as an effort to discourage and harass the female workers, then the pinups
would be subject to restriction under a discrimination-centered model of harassment, and the
restriction would be permissible under the First Amendment because of Mitchell's protective
umbrella.
"87 See Robinson, 760 F. Supp at 1499-501; supra note 184.
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statements to find either discrimination itself or that the conduct was sufficiently
severe or pervasive to affect a term or condition of employment.'88
V. CONCLUSION
The discrimination-centered model of sexual harassment is based on a formal
version of equality: discrimination exists when women are treated differently because
of their sex." 9 Professor MacKinnon calls this the "differences" approach. 9 ° The
model eschews what has become the predominant academic perspective on
harassment, the antisubordination approach. The model does not do this because
formal equality provides a better theoretical explanation of the problem. It may well
be that, for the bulk of cases, the antisubordination approach describes the nature of
the wrong and the need for remedy better. Instead, the discrimination-centered model
relies on the formal version of equality for two principal reasons. First, the formal
equality approach is broader than the antisubordination approach. It is broad enough
to encompass easily all those marginal cases that Professor Franke discusses, '9'
without jeopardizing the core cases which fall within the antisubordination theory.
This breadth is important because the marginal cases cover some of the most
vulnerable and abused; they cannot be left behind. Second, the formal equality
model counters sexual harassment exceptionalism and brings harassment law back
into the familiar territory occupied by the rest of discrimination law. This is
important because it permits harassment law to borrow broadly from concepts well
developed elsewhere, because the familiarity may encourage judges (especially) and
juries to interpret harassment law generously, and because it weakens attempts by
opponents to minimize and marginalize harassment law. Opponents cannot claim
that harassment law merely is a power move by feminists or that the First
8 The ability of the discrimination-centered model to accommodate First Amendment
concerns is important because, even if the courts do not strike down the law under the First
Amendment, they may weaken sexual harassment doctrine by interpreting Title VII narrowly
to avoid having to face the First Amendment issues. See DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police
Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 596-97 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 974 (1995) (holding
that conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute sexual harassment, in part
because of First Amendment concerns). See generally NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
440 U.S. 490, 499-501, 504 (1979) (stating that courts should construe statutes so as to avoid
serious constitutional problems unless such construction is clearly contrary to the intent of
Congress).
89 For an insightful presentation and analysis of formal equality, see Paul Brest, The
Supreme Court 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90
HARv. L. REV. 1 (1976). For a critique and historical overview, see Mary Becker, The Sixties
Shift to Formal Equality and the Courts: An Argument for Pragmatism and Politics, 40 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 209 (1998).
90 See MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 192-208.
19' See supra text accompanying notes 125-29, 134-3 7.
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Amendment applies only to harassment law but not to the rest of discrimination law.
The formal model of equality ties the fate of harassment law to the fate of
discrimination law generally. Although we may despair about both at times, the
antidiscrimination banner has led this country through its most important domestic
battles from the Civil War, to Brown v. Board of Education,'92 to Title VII. It is
battle worn, battle tested, strong, and, most importantly, right. The antiharassment
effort will be strengthened by following closely behind.
19 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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